12 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: Quine rejects Carnap's view that the methods of science and philosophy are distinct. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5 | |
A reaction: I can't decide this one. Leibniz agreed with Carnap, but rated philosophy more highly. I like the view of philosophy as continuous with science, but that doesn't make it a branch of science. I incline towards science being a branch of philosophy. |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
Full Idea: I think there is no commitment to entities through use of alleged names of them; other things being equal, we can always deny the allegation that the words in question are names. | |
From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.205) | |
A reaction: Hm. So why can't you deny that variables actually refer to existing entities? If I say 'I just saw James', it's a bit cheeky to then deny that James refers to anyone. He uses Russell's technique to paraphrase names. |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
Full Idea: Through our variables of quantification we are quite capable of committing ourselves to entities which cannot be named individually at all in the resources of our language; witness the real numbers. | |
From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.205) | |
A reaction: The real numbers are uncountable, and thus cannot all be named. This is quite an impressive point. I've always had doubts about the existence of real numbers, on the grounds that they could never all be named. |
19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: One robust feature of our intuitions about whether we know things is that they tend to vacillate. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as important. If we were tacit invariantists (Idea 19557) we should be able to ask ourselves whether we 'really and truly' know various things, but we can't decide. I know lots about Nietzsche in a pub, and very little in a university. |
19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Maybe contextualists are too quick to appeal to our conflicting intuitions regarding knowledge. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: An important point (from Earl Conee). I thoroughly approve of contextualism, but the whole status of whether a witness or a teacher knows what they are talking about is in danger of collapsing into relativism. This is what peer review is all about. |
19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: On my own view, the context sensivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: That sounds right, and it reinforces the idea that 'justification' is a more important epistemological concept than 'knowledge'. 'Am I justified in believing p?' Answer: 'it depends how well you have researched it'. |
19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualism is a 'good news, bad news' theory. The good news is that we have lots of knowledge and many surfaces are 'flat'; the bad news is that knowledge and flatness are not all they were cracked up to be. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: That is exactly my position. I lost all interest in whether someone precisely 'knows' or 'does not know' something a long time ago (even in scientific or forensic contexts). In the case of flatness the case is even more obvious. |
19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualism concedes that there is some truth to skepticism, but contains the damage by holding that skeptical claims are true only relative to atypically strict contexts. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: My attitude to scepticism is that everything we ever affirm should have a footnote saying '...but you never know...', and it should then be ignored. In the strictest context everything is doubted simultaneously (including language), and that is paralysis. |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
Full Idea: If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence. Ontology then ends up on a par with natural science. | |
From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.211) | |
A reaction: Carnap says ontology is relative to a linguistic framework. 'External' ontology is empty. This quotation gives Quine's main motivation for denying the analytic/synthetic distinction. |
4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I do not attribute to nature either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or confused. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1665?) | |
A reaction: This is clearly a statement of Hume's famous later opinion that there are no values ('ought') in nature ('is'). It is a rejection of Aristotelian and Greek teleology. It is hard to argue with, but I have strong sales resistance, rooted in virtue theory. |
4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I define God as a being consisting in infinite attributes, whereof each is infinite or supremely perfect. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1661) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the glorious culmination of the hyperbolic conception of God that expands steadily from wood spirits through Zeus, to eventually mop up everything in nature, and then everything that can be imagined beyond nature. All very silly. |
4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Those who endeavour to establish God's existence and the truth of religion by means of miracles seek to prove the obscure by what is more obscure. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1675?) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. On the whole this has to be right, but one must leave open a possibility. If there is a God, and He seeks to prove Himself by a deed, are we saying this is impossible? Divine intervention might be the best explanation of something. |