Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Hellman', 'Internal and External Reasons' and 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16473	Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: Chalmers' 'modal rationalist' is one who identifies what is possible with what is conceivable; the central claim of the doctrine is that we have a priori access to modal truth.
	From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 5
	A reaction: A helpful clarification, as I can now see how hopelessly and utterly wrong Chalmers is (about almost everything), and I find my confidence in any sort of genuine a priori knowledge (except of conceptual relations) dwindling by the minute.

19258	Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
	Full Idea: For Chalmers, that water is XYZ is 'primary possible' (a priori, or conceptually), because it is true in some world considered as actual. It is 'secondary impossible', when it is evaluated from the Earth as actual.
	From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence Intro
	A reaction: [compressed] This is Chalmers' account of how we can know possibility from conceivability, via his two-dimensional semantics (see alphabetical themes).

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

9379	A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
	Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
	From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

9284	Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: Someone has 'internal reasons' to act when the person has some motive which will be served or furthered by the action; if this turns out not to be so, the reason is false. Reasons are 'external' when there is no such condition.
	From: Bernard Williams (Internal and External Reasons [1980], p.101)
	A reaction: [compressed] An external example given is a family tradition of joining the army, if the person doesn't want to. Williams says (p.111) external reason statements are actually false, and a misapplication of the concept of a 'reason to act'. See Idea 8815.