8 ideas
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition. | |
| From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3 | |
| A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers? |
| 22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: One might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral category. ...Regarding certain things even as alternatives is itself something to be regarded as dishonourable or morally absurd. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: He's very tentative about this, but I think it is a powerful moral idea. See Kekes. He is particularly aiming at utilitarians, who happily assess vile possibilities. |
| 22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of consequentialism in general. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Utilitarians might achieve comparison by totting up the happiness in each situation, but once you include the consequences of the consequences the problems are obvious. Was 1789 a good thing? Too early to say. |
| 22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Making the best of a bad job is a consequentialist maxim, and it will have something to say even pn the difference between massacring seven million and massacring seven million and one. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: If every life counts, the consequentialists have got something right here. Not caring exactly how many were massacred is a sort of callousness (even when the number can't be established). |
| 22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If the goodness of the world were to consist in people's fulfilling their obligations, it would by no means follow that one of my obligations was to bring it about that other people kept their obligations | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: If the maxim of my action is 'ensure that everyone does their duty', presumably that can be universalised. Nelson thought so. It just sounds like a hideous world of self-righteous interference. |
| 22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism cannot hope to make sense, at any serious level, of integrity. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 1) | |
| A reaction: There will be obvious problems with this. 'My whole platoon got killed, but looking on the bright side, I preserved my integrity'. Once a theory commits entirely to one value, it then has no way to make sense of rival values. |
| 17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks] |
| Full Idea: Eternalism says all times are equally real. Objects existing at past times and objects existing at future times are just as real as objects existing at the present. Properties had at past and future times are as much properties as those at the present. | |
| From: Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: He adds that the present is therefore 'subjective', resulting from one's perspective. Why would eternalists reject their subjective experiences of time, unless they reject all their other subjective experiences as well? |
| 17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Merricks argues that the growing block view says that we live in the subjective present, and that there is a growing edge of being, but he then suggests that these two could come apart, and it would make no difference, so the growing block is incoherent. | |
| From: report of Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [I think that is the nub of his argument. I couldn't find a concise summary in his words] |