Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Hellman', 'Internal and External Reasons' and 'Mathematical Logic (revised)'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic

12221	'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
	Full Idea: A 'quasi-quotation' [corner quotes, Quine quotes] designates that (unspecified) expression which is obtained from the contents of the corners by replacing the Greek letters by the (unspecified) expressions which they designate.
	From: Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940], 1.6)
	A reaction: Filed under 'variables', as they seem to be variables that can refer to actual expressions, like algebra. Quine was determined to distinguish clearly between 'mention' and 'use'. 'Half-hearted substitutional quantification', says Fine.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated

19321	We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
	Full Idea: Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'.
	From: report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6
	A reaction: Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

9379	A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
	Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
	From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

9284	Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: Someone has 'internal reasons' to act when the person has some motive which will be served or furthered by the action; if this turns out not to be so, the reason is false. Reasons are 'external' when there is no such condition.
	From: Bernard Williams (Internal and External Reasons [1980], p.101)
	A reaction: [compressed] An external example given is a family tradition of joining the army, if the person doesn't want to. Williams says (p.111) external reason statements are actually false, and a misapplication of the concept of a 'reason to act'. See Idea 8815.