Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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27 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
     A reaction: Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
     Full Idea: Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
     A reaction: It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
     A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
     Full Idea: We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
     A reaction: We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is not necessary to deny a substance or substratum underlying appearances; it is merely expedient (by the application of Occam's Razor) to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §V)
     A reaction: Russell then goes on to struggle heroically in attempts to give accounts of 'matter' and 'objects' entirely in terms of 'sense-data'. If he failed, as many think he did, should we go back to belief in Aristotelian substance?
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
     Full Idea: The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
     A reaction: It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
     Full Idea: The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI)
     A reaction: This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
     Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII)
     A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly.
6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1
     A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it.
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
     Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5
     A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell).
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
     Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)
     A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical.
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
     Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV)
     A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it.
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
     Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV)
     A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
6459 We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
     Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II)
     A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?'
6460 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
     Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)
     A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects.
6461 Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
     Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?'
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)
     A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
     Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II)
     A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical.
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
     Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII)
     A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
6470 Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
     Full Idea: We offer the following tentative definition: The matter of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IX)
     A reaction: This strikes me as empiricism gone mad. Russell is famous for being a 'realist', but you would hardly know it at this point. Personally I put emphasis on 'best explanation', which fairly simply delivers most of our commonsense understandings of reality.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
6468 There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
     Full Idea: In addition to the private spaces, ..there is the 'space of perspectives', since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII)
     A reaction: This replaces his concept of 'public space', which he introduced in 1912. Russell gradually dropped this, but I like the idea that we somehow directly perceive space in two ways simultaneously (which led him to say that space is six-dimensional).