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8216
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Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
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Full Idea:
Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes.
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From:
Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.76)
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A reaction:
This, I think, is because there is in Derrida, as in most French philosophers, a strong streak of Marxism, and a desire to change the world, rather than merely understanding it. Idea 8213 shows the sort of thing he wants to change.
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8213
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I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
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Full Idea:
I have tried to analyse certain marks in writing which are undecidables, false verbal properties, which inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, withour ever leaving room for a solution.
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From:
Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.40)
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A reaction:
[I have simplified his sentence!] Much of Derrida seems to be a commentary on the Hegelian dialectic, and the project is presumably to figure out why philosophy is not advancing in the way we would like. Interesting...
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14296
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Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
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Full Idea:
Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
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A reaction:
A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
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6755
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For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
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Full Idea:
Hempel proposes that explanations involve covering laws and antecedent conditions; this view (the 'covering law' view) has two versions, the deductive-nomological model and the probabilistic-statistical model of explanation.
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From:
report of Carl Hempel (Aspects of Scientific Explanation [1965]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.2
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A reaction:
The obvious problem with this approach, it seem to me, is that the laws themselves need explanation, and I don't see how a law can be foundational unless there is a divine law-giver. Are the laws arbitrary and axiomatic?
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