Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'A Plea for Substitutional Quantification' and 'Classical Cosmology (frags)'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic

9470	Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
	Full Idea: Modal logic is not an extensional language.
	From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.159 n8)
	A reaction: [I record this for investigation. Possible worlds seem to contain objects]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

9469	Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
	Full Idea: I argue (against Quine) that the existential quantifier substitutionally interpreted has a genuine claim to express a concept of existence, which may give the best account of linguistic abstract entities such as propositions, attributes, and classes.
	From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
	A reaction: Intuitively I have my doubts about this, since the whole thing sounds like a verbal and conventional game, rather than anything with a proper ontology. Ruth Marcus and Quine disagree over this one.

9468	On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
	Full Idea: For the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, a sentence of the form '(∃x) Fx' is true iff there is some closed term 't' of the language such that 'Ft' is true. For the objectual interpretation some object x must exist such that Fx is true.
	From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
	A reaction: How could you decide if it was true for 't' if you didn't know what object 't' referred to?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology

5994	Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
	Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
	From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.