11 ideas
| 10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
| Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183) | |
| A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers. |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
| A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
| A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
| 17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
| Full Idea: The semantic approach contends that theoretical models ...are candidates for representing physical systems by virtue of the fact that they stand in mapping relations to corresponding data-models. | |
| From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
| A reaction: Sounds like a neat and satisfying picture. |
| 17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The 'received view' of models is that they are Tarskian formal axiomatic calculi interpreted by meta-mathematical models. The 'semantic' view of models gives equal importance to their representational capacity. | |
| From: report of Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'background') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The Tarskian view is the one covered in my section on Model Theory. Portides favours the semantic account, and I am with him all the way. Should models primarily integrate with formal systems, or with the world? Your choice... |
| 17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
| Full Idea: Models are representational, independently of the strength of their relation to theory, depending on how well they achieve the purpose of providing explanations for what occurs in physical systems. | |
| From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
| A reaction: This doesn't sound quite right. It seems possible to have a perfect representation of a system which remains quite baffling (because too complex, or with obscure ingredients). Does the stylised London tube map explain well but represent badly? |
| 17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
| Full Idea: The unified model can be considered a better representation of the atomic nucleus in comparison to the liquid-drop and shell models, because it explains most of the known results about the nucleus. | |
| From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
| A reaction: The point here is that models are evaluated not just by their accuracy, but by their explanatory power. Presumably a great model is satisfying and illuminating. Do the best models capture the essence of a thing? |
| 17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
| Full Idea: A better understanding of 'model', as used in science, could be achieved if we examine it as a member of the triad of concepts of representation, idealisation and abstraction. | |
| From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: Abstraction seems to have a bad name in philosophy, and yet when you come to discuss things like models, you can't express it any other way. |
| 17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
| Full Idea: 'Theory-driven' models are constructed in a systematic theory-regulated way by supplementing the theoretical calculus with locally operative hypotheses. 'Phenomenological' models deploy semi-empirical results, with ad hoc hypotheses, and extra concepts. | |
| From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I am not at all clear about this distinction, even after reading his whole article. The first type of model seems more general, while the second seems tuned to particular circumstances. He claims the second type is more explanatory. |
| 17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
| Full Idea: If theoretical models are highly abstract and idealised descriptions of phenomena, they may only represent general features, and fail to explain the specific mechanisms at work in physical systems. | |
| From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] While there may be an ideal theory that explains everything, it sounds right capturing the actual mechanism (such as the stirrup bone in the ear) is not at all theoretical. |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |
| A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |