47 ideas
8766 | In much wisdom is much grief [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: In much wisdom is much grief. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.18) | |
A reaction: If this is true, then the question is of what there is in wisdom that will compensate for the grief. Personally I doubt the whole claim. Some wisdom involves grief, but most of it involves pleasure, even when understanding of evil is the target. |
7494 | Laughter is mad; of mirth, what doeth it? [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, what doeth it? | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 02.02) | |
A reaction: Not much of an argument, but an interesting support for the extreme anti-hedonistic puritanical view. Most people would praise laughter as an end in itself, so 'what doeth it?' seems to miss the point. |
8767 | Sorrow is better than laughter [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 07.03) | |
A reaction: This writer fails to see the good in laughter. If he did, he would have a more balanced view, and we could take this opinion more seriously. Theatre audiences always seem keen to hunt out jokes where none are intended. |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Philosophers who oppose conceptual analysis identify their approach as being 'naturalistic'. Philosophy is supposed to be continuous with science, and philosophical theories are to be defended on explanatory grounds, not by a priori intuitions. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: [They cite Papineau 1993, Devitt 1996 aand Kornblith 2002] I think there is a happy compromise here. I agree that any philosophical knowledge should be continuous with science, but we shouldn't prejudge how the analytic branch of science is done. |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
Full Idea: I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat. …There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126) | |
A reaction: Philosophy is generalisation. Science holds the upper hand, because it settles the subject-matter to be generalised. |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
Full Idea: Felix Klein's so-called 'Erlangerprogramm' in geometry involved characterizing the various branches of geometry by what transformations were irrelevant to each. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.137) |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Yellow' and 'water' are mass terms, concerned only with spread; 'apple' and 'square' are terms of divided reference, concerned with both spread and individuation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.124) | |
A reaction: Would you like some apple? Pass me that water. It is helpful to see that it is a requirement of 'individuation' that is missing from terms for stuff. |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
Full Idea: Once we can legitimize a disposition term by defining the relevant similarity standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so by-pass the similarity. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.135) | |
A reaction: I love mechanisms, but can we characterise mechanisms without mentioning powers and dispositions? Quine's dream is to eliminate 'similarity'. |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
Full Idea: Intuitively, what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to them. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.130) | |
A reaction: If you can judge that the similar things 'will' dissolve, you can cut to the chase and judge that this thing will dissolve. |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A growing number of philosophers are attracted to modified forms of empiricism, emphasizing psychological relations between the conceptual system and perceptual and motor states, not semantic relations. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I suddenly spot that this is what I have been drifting towards for some time! The focus is concept formation, where the philosophers need to join forces with the cognitive scientists. |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
Full Idea: Sciences differ from common sense only in the degree of methodological sophistication. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.129) | |
A reaction: Science is normal thinking about the world, but it is teamwork, with the bar set very high. |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
Full Idea: Induction is essentially only more of the same: animal expectation or habit formation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125) | |
A reaction: My working definition of induction is 'learning from experience', but that doesn't disagree with Quine. Lipton has a richer account of different types of induction. Quine's point is that it rests on resemblance. |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
Full Idea: Induction expresses our hopes that similar causes will have similar effects. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125) | |
A reaction: Some top philosophers are also top teachers, and Quine was one of them, in his writings. He boils it down for the layman. Once again, he is pointing to the fundamental role of the similarity relation. |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
Full Idea: What makes Goodman's example a puzzle is the dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. It might be best expressed as revealing a problem with sortal terms, as employed by Geach, or by Wiggins. Grue is a bit silly, but sortals are subject to convention and culture. 'Natural' properties seem needed. |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
Full Idea: Things are similar to the extent that they are interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.134) | |
A reaction: This is a major idea for Quine, because it is a means to gradually eliminate the fuzzy ideas of 'resemblance' or 'similarity' or 'natural kind' from science. I love it! Two tigers are same insofar as they are substitutable. |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
Full Idea: The usual general term, whether a common noun or a verb or an adjective, owes its generality to some resemblance among the things referred to. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116) | |
A reaction: Quine has a nice analysis of the basic role of similarity in a huge amount of supposedly strict scientific thought. |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
Full Idea: According to the 'respects' view, our learning of yellow by ostension would have depended on our first having been told or somehow apprised that it was going to be a question of color. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.122) | |
A reaction: Quine suggests there is just one notion of similarity, and respects can be 'abstracted' afterwards. Even the ontologically ruthless Quine admits psychological abstraction! |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
Full Idea: A standard of similarity is in some sense innate. The spacing of qualities (such as red, pink and blue) can be explored and mapped in the laboratory by experiments. They are needed for all learning. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.123) | |
A reaction: This reasserts Hume's original point in more scientific terms. It is one of the undeniable facts about our perceptions of qualities and properties, no matter how platonist your view of universals may be. |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: It is claimed, on the basis of empirical research, that the type of body that an organism has profoundly affects it cognitive operations and the way it conceptualises the world. We can't assume that human minds could inhere in wildly different body types. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds interesting. They cite Lawrence Shapiro 2004. It needs a large effort of imagination to think how a snake or whale or albatross might conceptualise the world, in relation to their bodies. |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The language of thought is taken to have subject/predicate form and include logical devices, such as quantifiers and variables. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The three main options for the ontological status of concepts are to identify them with mental representations, or with abilities, or with Fregean senses. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1) |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: It may be possible to have propositional attitudes without having the mental representations tokened in one's head. ...We may say a chess-playing computer thinks it should develop its queen early, though we know it has no representation with that content. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Thye cite Dennett - who talks of the 'intentional stance'] It is, of course, a moot point whether we would attribute a propositional attitude (such as belief) to a machine once we knew that it wasn't representing the relevant concepts. |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A standard criticism is that the mental representation view of concepts creates just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we have a vicious regress, or we might as well explain external language directly. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [They cite Dummett, with Wittgenstein in the background] I don't agree, because I think that explanation of concepts only stops when it dovetails into biology. |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The view that concepts are abilities (e.g. found in Brandom, Dummett and Millikan) would say that the concept CAT amounts to the ability to discriminate cats from non-cats and to draw certain inferences about cats. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Feels wrong. The concept is what makes these abilities possible, but it seems rather behaviourist to identify the concept with what is enabled by the concept. You might understand 'cat', but fail to recognise your first cat (though you might suspect it). |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The abilities view of concepts, by its rejection of mental representation, is ill-equipped to explain the productivity of thought; and it can say little about mental processes. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The latter point arises from its behaviouristic character, which just gives us a black box with some output of abilities. In avoiding a possible regress, it offers no explanation at all. |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The structures of concepts are invoked to explain typicality effects, reflective categorization, cognitive development, reference determination, and compositionality. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.5) |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The classical theory is that a concept has a definitional structure in that it is composed of simpler concepts that express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under the concept, the stock example being unmarried and a man for 'bachelor'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is the background idea to philosophy as analysis, and it makes concepts essentially referential, in that they are defined by their ability to pick things out. There must be some degree of truth in the theory. |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The classical view is challenged by the discovery that certain categories are taken to be more typical, with typicality widely correlating with other data. Apples are judged to be more typical of (and have more common features with) fruit than plums are. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This discovery that people use prototypes in thinking has been the biggest idea to ever hit the philosophy of concepts, and simply cannot be ignored (as long as the research keeps reinforcing it, which I believe it does). The classical view might adapt. |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The appeal of the classical theory of concepts is that it offers unified treatments of concept acquisition (assembling constituents), categorization (check constituents against target), and reference determination (whether they apply). | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 11128 for the theory] As so often, I find myself in sympathy with the traditional view which has been relegated to ignominy by our wonderful modern philosophers. |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: In the light of problems such as the definition of knowledge, many philosophers now take seriously the possibility that our concepts lack definitional structure. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This challenges the classical view, that there are precise conditions for each concept. That view would obviously be in difficulties with atomic concepts, so our account of those might be applied all the way up. |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: In the prototype theory of concepts, a lexical concept has probabilistic structure in that something falls under it if it satisfies a sufficient number of properties encoded by the constituents. It originates in Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It would seem unlikely to be a matter of the 'number' of properties, and would have to involve some notion of what was essential to the prototype. |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: On the prototype theory, categorization is to be understood as a similarity comparison process, where similarity is computed as a function of the number of constituents that two concepts hold in common. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Again it strikes me that 'computing' similarity by mere 'number' of shared constituents won't do, as there is a prior judgement about which constituents really matter, or are essential. That may even be hard-wired. |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: When it comes to more reflexive judgements, people go beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison. Even children say that a dog surgically altered to look like a raccoon is still a dog. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: We can defend the theory by not underestimating people so much. Most categorisation is done on superficial grounds, but even children know there may be hidden similarities (behind the mask, under the bonnet) which are more important. |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: An objection to the prototype view concerns compositionality. A complex concept often has emergent properties, as when it seems that 'pet fish' encodes for brightly coloured, which has no basis in the prototypes for 'pet' or 'fish'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I would take 'pet fish' to work like a database query. 'Fish' has a very vague prototype, and then 'pet fish' narrows the search to fish which are appropriate to be pets. We might say that the prototype is refined, or the Mk 2 prototype appears. |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Many patently complex concepts don't even have a prototype structure, such as 'Chairs that were purchased on a Wednesday'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [The example seems to be from Fodor] I disagree. If we accept the notion of 'refining' the prototype (see Idea 11135), then the compositionality of the expression will produce a genuine but very unusual prototype. |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The theory theory of concepts says that terms are related as in a scientific theory, and that categorization resembles theorising. It is generally assumed that scientific terms are interdefined so that content is determined by its role in the theory. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I never like this sort of account. What are the characteristics of the thing which enable it to fulfil its role? You haven't defined a car when you've said it gets you from A to B. |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A problem with the theory theory of concepts is that it is holistic, saying a concept is determined by its role, not by its constituents. It then seems difficult for different people to possess the same concepts (or even the same person, over time). | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This seems a good objection to any holistic account of concepts or meaning - spotted by Plato in motivating his theory of Forms, to give the necessary stability to communication. |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: According to conceptual atomism, lexical concepts have no semantic structure, and the content of a concept isn't determined by its relation to other concepts but by its relations to the world. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [They cite Fodor 1998 and Millikan 2000] I like the sound of that, because I take the creation of concepts to be (in the first instance) a response to the world, not a response to other concepts. |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: People seem to be able to formulate novel concepts which are left to be named later; the concept comes first, the name second. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 4.2) | |
A reaction: [This seems to have empirical support, and he cites Pinker 1994] I do not find this remotely surprising, since I presume that human concepts are a continuous kind with animal concepts, including non-conscious concepts (why not?). |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Projectible' predicates are predicates F and G whose shared instances all do count, for whatever reason, towards confirmation of 'All F are G'. ….A projectible predicate is one that is true of all and only the things of a kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.115-6) | |
A reaction: Both Quine and Goodman are infuriatingly brief about the introduction of this concept. 'Red' is true of all ripe tomatoes, but not 'only' of them. Hardly any predicates are true only of one kind. Is that a scholastic 'proprium'? |
8765 | All is vanity, saith the Preacher [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.02) | |
A reaction: If we are swamped by vanity, then there is presumably no hope for the other virtues. A more balanced view would say that we should aim for a mean on the scale of self-esteem, which probably requires an effort to be objective about ourselves. |
8768 | Books are endless, and study is wearisome [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: Of making many books there is no end; and much study is weariness of the flesh. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 12.12) | |
A reaction: Does anyone share my occasional sinking heart on entering a large library or bookshop? I truly believe that there is nothing better in the world than books. And yet, and yet... |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
Full Idea: The concept of natural kinds was reintroduced by Quine, who may now regret the way it has become a stand-in for the dubious but covertly popular concept of essences. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.2 n2 | |
A reaction: He is right that Quine would regret it, and he is right that we can't assume that there are necessary essences just because there seem to be stable natural kinds, but personally I am an essentialist, so I'm not that bothered. |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
Full Idea: If similarity has no degrees there is no containing of kinds within broader kinds. If colored things are a kind, they are similar, but red things are too narrow for a kind. If red things are a kind, colored things are not similar, and it's too broad. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.118) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I'm on Quine's side with this. We glibly talk of 'kinds', but the criteria for sorting things into kinds seems to be a mess. Quine goes on to offer a better account than the (diadic, yes-no) one rejected here. |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
Full Idea: With the triadic relation of comparative similarity, kinds can contain one another, as well as overlapping. Red and colored things can both count as kinds. Colored things all resemble one another, even though less than red things do. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.119) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Quine claims that comparative similarity is necessary for kinds - that there be some 'foil' in a similarity - that A is more like C than B is. |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
Full Idea: If kinds are based on similarity, this has the Imperfect Community problem. Red round, red wooden and round wooden things all resemble one another somehow. There may be nothing outside the set resembling them, so it meets the definition of kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.120) | |
A reaction: [ref. to Goodman 'Structure' 2nd 163- , which attacks Carnap on this] This suggests an invocation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, which won't be much help for natural kinds. |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
Full Idea: Why there have been regularities is an obscure question, for it is hard to see what would count as an answer. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126) | |
A reaction: This is the standard pessimism of the 20th century Humeans, but it strikes me as comparable to the pessimism about science found in Locke and Hume. Regularities are explained all the time by scientists, though the lowest level may be hopeless. |