3 ideas
15923 | Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Poincaré rejected the actual infinite. He viewed mathematics that is apparently concerned with the actual infinite as actually concerning the finite linguistic definitions the putatively describe actually infinite objects. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning [1894]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite |
14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3 | |
A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers? |
6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
Full Idea: The 'Relevant Alternatives' theory of knowledge said the main ingredient that must be added to true belief to make knowledge is that one be in a position to rule out all the relevant alternatives to what one believes. | |
From: report of Fred Dretske (Epistemic Operators [1970]) by Keith DeRose - Intro: Responding to Skepticism §6 | |
A reaction: Dretske and Nozick are associated with this strategy. There will obviously be a problem in defining 'relevant'. Otherwise it sounds quite close to Plato's suggestion that we need true belief with 'logos'. |