Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Two Chief World Systems' and 'talk'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
     A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
     Full Idea: If it were asserted that the Form of the Beautiful was itself beautiful, such a statement would require a prior understanding of the concept of beauty, so would immediately lead to an infinite regress, so the Forms can't be self-predicating.
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is a nice clear statement of the mess that Plato gets himself into if he wants the Forms to be self-predicating. Clearly the Form of the Beautiful can't be beautiful, but must be that which gives other things their beauty.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway]
     Full Idea: At what point does an object become 'whole'?
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This nice question strikes me as the central one in mereology. It is tempting to reply that the matter is entirely conventional, but there seems an obvious fact about something missing if one piece is absent from a jigsaw, or a cube is chipped.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway]
     Full Idea: If the Chinese Room is functionally equivalent to a Mandarin speaker, it ought to be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin (and it can't).
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Searle might triumphantly say that this proves there is no understanding in the room, but the objection won't go away, because the room is presumably functionally equivalent to a speaker, and not just a mere translator (who might use mechanical tricks).
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: Galileo conceives of movement in mathematical terms. ...In doing so, he uncovered, beyond the variations of position and speed, the mathematical invariant of movement - that is to say, acceleration.
     From: report of Galileo Galilei (Two Chief World Systems [1632]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5
     A reaction: That is a very nice advert for the mathematical physics which replaced the Aristotelian substantial forms. ...And yet, is acceleration some deep fact about nature, or a concept which is only needed if you insist on being mathematical?