Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius'' and 'Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind

19355	The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The soul does many things without knowing how it does them - when it does them by means of confused perceptions and unconscious inclinations or appetites.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L])
	A reaction: This increasingly strikes me as a wonderful and important insight for its time. He's really paid attention to his own mind, and given up the simplistic view that derives from Descartes. Are birds conscious? Yes or no! Silly.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism

19350	We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I think we should keep both sides: we should be more Democritean and make all actions of bodies mechanical and independent of souls, and we should also be more than Platonic and hold that all actions of souls are immaterial and independent of mechanism.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [C])
	A reaction: This is about as dualist as it is possible to get. It certainly looks as if many of Leibniz's doctrines are rebellions against Spinoza (in this case his 'dual aspect monism'). I take Leibniz to be utterly but heroically wrong.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions

20034	Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
	Full Idea: Bratman's three main norms of intention are 'internal consistency' (between a person's intentions), 'means-end coherence' (the means must fit the end), and 'consistency with the agent's beliefs' (especially intending to do and believing you won't do).
	From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
	A reaction: These are controversial, but have set the agenda for modern non-reductive discussions of intention.

20033	Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
	Full Idea: Intentions involve normative commitments. We settle on intended courses, if there is no reason to reconsider them, and intentions put pressure on us to form further intentions in order to more efficiently coordinate our actions.
	From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
	A reaction: [a compression of their summary] This distinguishes them from beliefs and desires, which contain no such normative requirements, even though they may point that way.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention

20026	Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
	Full Idea: We need to distinguish intention as an aim or goal of actions, and intentions as a distinctive state of commitment to future action, a state that results from and subsequently constrains our practical endeavours as planning agents.
	From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
	A reaction: I'm not sure how distinct these are, given the obvious possibility of intermediate stages, and the embracing of any available short-cut. If I could mow my lawn with one blink, I'd do it.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions

20032	Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
	Full Idea: Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
	From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
	A reaction: If I thought my belief was a bit warped, and my desire morally corrupt, my higher self might refuse to form an intention. If so, then Bratman is onto something. But maybe my higher self has its own beliefs and desires.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature

19356	Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In music, the soul counts the beats of the vibrating object which makes the sound, and when these beats regularly coincide at short intervals, it finds them pleasing. Thus it counts without knowing it.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L])
	A reaction: Only a mathematician would see music this way! He is defending his account of the unconscious mind. The proposal that we unconsciously count sounds highly implausible. He needs to recognise the patterns that ground mathematics.