12 ideas
9123 | Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in. | |
From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3 | |
A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'? |
18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
Full Idea: Suppose I say that I have given up precisely three beliefs since lunch. An over-coarse individuation could reduce the number to two, and an over-fine one could raise it to four. | |
From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.144) | |
A reaction: Obviously if you ask how many beliefs I hold, it would be crazy to give a precise answer. But if I search for my cat, I give up my belief that it is in the kitchen, in the lounge and in the bathroom. That's precise enough to be three beliefs, I think. |
18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
Full Idea: A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry. | |
From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139) | |
A reaction: Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas. |
18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
Full Idea: The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition. | |
From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140) | |
A reaction: If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'. |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |
18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |
Full Idea: Unless we are prepared to believe that absolute position makes sense, the very idea of a point as an entity in its own right must be rejected as not merely mysterious but absurd. | |
From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.149) | |
A reaction: The fact that without absolute position we can only think of 'points' as relative to a conceptual grid doesn't stop the grid from picking out actual locations in space, as shown by latitude and longitude. |