10 ideas
| 14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I) | |
| A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity? |
| 9379 | A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine] |
| Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
| A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"? |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: The essential difference between persons and other creatures is in the structure of the will, with their peculiar characteristic of being able to form 'second-order desires'. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], Intro) | |
| A reaction: There are problems with this - notably that all strategies of this kind just shift the problem up to the next order, without solving it - but this still strikes me as a very promising line of thinking when trying to understand ourselves. See Idea 9266. |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II) | |
| A reaction: Watson criticises Frankfurt for just pushing the problem up to the the next level, but Frankfurt is not offering to explain the will. He merely notes that this structure produces the sort of behaviour which is characteristic of persons, and he is right. |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: The statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §III) | |
| A reaction: A good proposal. It covers kleptomaniacs and drug addicts quite well. Thieves have second-order desires (to steal) of which kleptomaniacs are incapable. There is actually no such thing as free will, but this sort of thing will do. |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed) | |
| A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference. |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: A person's will is the effective desire which moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. The will is not coextensive with what an agent intends to do, since he may do something else instead. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §I) | |
| A reaction: Essentially Hobbes's view, but with an arbitrary distinction added. If the desire is only definitely a 'will' if it really does lead to action, then it only becomes the will after the action starts. The error is thinking that will is all-or-nothing. |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Frankfurt says that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of 'acting on a desire with which the agent identifies'. | |
| From: report of Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1 | |
| A reaction: [the cite Frankfurt 1988 and 1999] I'm not sure how that works when performing a grim duty, but it sounds quite plausible. |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: I use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second-order, they have no second-order volitions. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II) | |
| A reaction: He seems to be describing someone who behaves like an animal, performing actions without ever stopping to think about them. Presumably some persons occasionally become wantons, if, for example, they have an anger problem. |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §IV) | |
| A reaction: Frankfurt seems to be one of the first to assert this break with the traditional view. Good for him. I take moral responsibility to hinge on an action being caused by a person, but not with a mystical view of what a person is. |