Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Individuation of Attributes', 'fragments/reports' and 'The iterative conception of Set'

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII

18192	Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]
	Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception.
	From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

18439	Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
	Full Idea: No two classes have exactly the same members, but two different attributes may be attributes of exactly the same things. Classes are identical when their members are identical. ...On the other hand, attributes have no clear principle of individuation.
	From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.100)

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

18442	You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
	Full Idea: May we not say that you know an attribute only insofar as you know what things have it?
	From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.106)
	A reaction: Simple, and the best defence of class nominalism (a very implausible theory) which I have encountered. Do I have to know all the things? Do I not know 'red' if I don't know tomatoes have it?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

18441	No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
	Full Idea: We have an acceptable notion of class, or physical object, or attribute, or any other sort of object, only insofar as we have an acceptable principle of individuation for that sort of object. There is no entity without identity.
	From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.102)
	A reaction: Note that this is his criterion for an 'acceptable' notion. Presumably that is for science. It permits less acceptable notions which don't come up to the standard. And presumably true things can be said about the less acceptable entities.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

18440	Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
	Full Idea: Physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive.
	From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.101)
	A reaction: The supposed counterexample to this is the statue and the clay it is made of, which are said to have different modal properties (destroying the statue doesn't destroy the clay).

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention

1556	By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
	Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
	From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8