Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'works' and 'Virtues and Vices'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
     Full Idea: For us there are four cardinal moral virtues: courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. But Aristotle and Aquinas call only three of these virtues moral virtues; practical wisdom (phronesis, prudentia) they class with the intellectual virtues.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.2)
     A reaction: I'm not sure about 'for us'. How many of us rank temperance as a supreme virtue? Aristotle ranks phronesis (which I think of as 'common sense') as the key enabler of the moral virtues, making it unlike the other intellectual virtues.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
     Full Idea: Knowledge that can be acquired only by someone who is clever or who has access to special training is not counted as part of wisdom.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.6)
     A reaction: Consider Pierre's peasant friend Platon Karatayev in 'War and Peace'. I assume 'special training' rules out anyone with a philosophy degree.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
     A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
     Full Idea: Hardly anyone sees any difficulty in the thought that virtues may sometimes be displayed in bad actions. The courage of the villain can be spoken of as quite unproblematic.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], III)
     A reaction: She cites Peter Geach as a sole opponent of this view. The courage of the entire German army in WWII seems to fall into this category. The boldness of villains has to impress the virtuous but timid.
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
     Full Idea: A popular view (expressed by Philippa Foot) is that the virtues work to 'correct' for the baser human impulses and motives. …Virtues are solutions to design flaws in human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978]) by Julia Driver - The Virtues and Human Nature 1
     A reaction: Quite a plausible thought. Not so much design flaws, though, as natural traits of character that suited hunter gatherers but not modern cosmopolitan capitalists. Driver disagrees.
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
     Full Idea: Some actions are in accordance with virtue without requiring virtue for their performance, whereas others are both in accordance with virtue and such as to show possession of a virtue.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.13)
     A reaction: She cites the case of an honest trader, who is honest because of self-interest. She is disentangling Kant from his daft idea that only dutiful (and reluctant) actions are virtuous. Kant was only thinking of 'in accordance' cases.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
     Full Idea: The virtues are corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], II)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple and accurate observation, which I don't remember meeting in Aristotle (...though she cites him as saying that virtues concern what is difficult for us). Justice and charity are given as examples of inadequate motivation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
     Full Idea: In some people temperance is not a virtue, but is rather connected with timidity or with a grudging attitude to the acceptance of good things.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], III)
     A reaction: Timidity seems right. The grudging attitude may result from some larger doubts about pleasure, which could be plausible.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]
     Full Idea: The fears that count against a man's courage are those that we think he should overcome, and among them, in a special class, those that reflect the fact that he values his safety too much.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], II)
     A reaction: I think that sentence tells us more accurately what courage is than anything in Aristotle's discussion. Ask yourself which of your fears really ought to be overcome, and particularly beware of over-valuing your own safety. But stay safe if you can!
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / b. Heat
Heat is a state of vibration, not a substance [Joule]
     Full Idea: We consider heat not as a substance but as a state of vibration.
     From: James Joule (works [1870]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 01 'Nature's'
     A reaction: The puzzle is that giving accurate accounts of vibrations, heat and movement require a quantitative substance, energy. But all we have here is movement, and the denial of a substance. Energy is 'nature's currency system'.
Joule showed that energy converts to heat, and heat to energy [Joule, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: James Joule established the equivalence of heat and mechanical energy, in the sense of showing that a specific amount of heat will always be produced by the expenditure of a given amount of energy, and vice versa.
     From: report of James Joule (works [1870]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 4.2
     A reaction: This was a major step towards the law of conservation of energy.