14296
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Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
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Full Idea:
Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
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A reaction:
A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
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4304
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Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
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Full Idea:
Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
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From:
John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
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A reaction:
Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?
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5467
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Euler said nature is instrinsically passive, and minds cause change [Euler, by Ellis]
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Full Idea:
Euler thought the powers necessary for the maintenance of the changing universe would turn out to be just the passive ones of inertia and impenetrability. There are no active powers, he urged, other than those of God and living beings.
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From:
report of Leonhard Euler (Letters to a German Princess [1765]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.4
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A reaction:
Very significant, I think, for revealing the religious framework behind early theories of natural laws. If there is nothing external to impose powers and movements on nature, the source must be sought within - hence essentialism.
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