Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types', 'Epistemic Justification' and 'Quaestiones de Potentia Dei'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility

18170	The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
	Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if it is true, the ramification it is meant to cope with was pointless to begin with.
	From: Willard Quine (Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types [1967], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1
	A reaction: Maddy says the rejection of Reducibility collapsed the ramified theory of types into the simple theory.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

17555	'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um)
	A reaction: [From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different?

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

19679	'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Strong 'access' internalism says the justification must be accessible to the person holding the belief (for cognitive duty, or blame), and weaker 'mentalist' internalism just says the justification must supervene on mental features of the individual.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] I think I'm a strong access internalist. I doubt whether there is a correct answer to any of this, but my conception of someone knowing something involves being able to invoke their reasons for it. Even if they forget the source.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

19678	Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Strong foundationalists require truth-preserving inferential links between the foundations and what the foundations support, while weaker versions allow weaker connections, such as inductive support, or best explanation, or probabilistic support.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], II)
	A reaction: [He cites Alston 1989] Personally I'm a coherentist about justification, but I'm a fan of best explanation, so I'd vote for that. It's just that best explanation is not a very foundationalist sort of concept. Actually, the strong version is absurd.