45 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If there is no way of settling metaphysical questions, then who cares whether or not they make sense? | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4 n20) | |
A reaction: This footnote is aimed at logical positivists, who seemed to worry about whether metaphysics made sense, and also dismissed its prospects even if it did make sense. |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The 'quietist' view of metaphysics says that realist metaphysics should be abandoned, not because its questions cannot be framed, but because their answers cannot be found. The real world of metaphysics is akin to Kant's noumenal world. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Blackburn, Dworkin, A.Fine, and Putnam-1987 as quietists] Fine aims to clarify the concepts of factuality and of ground, in order to show that metaphysics is possible. |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
Full Idea: I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat. …There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126) | |
A reaction: Philosophy is generalisation. Science holds the upper hand, because it settles the subject-matter to be generalised. |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Without a grasp of the concept of truth, not only language, but thought itself, is impossible. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16) | |
A reaction: Davidson never mentions animals, but I like this idea because it points to importance of truth for animals as well. I say that truth is relevant to any mind that makes judgements - and quite small animals (e.g. ants and spiders) make judgements. |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Plato's conflation of abstract universals with entities of supreme value reinforced the confusion of truth with the most eminent truths. …The only perfect exemplar of a Form is the Form itself, …and only truth itself is completely true. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.3) | |
A reaction: Even non-subscribers to Plato often talk as if there were some grand thing called the Truth with a capital T, quite often used in a religious context. Truth is the hallmark of successful (non-fanciful) thought. |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Since it is neither visible as a target, nor recognisable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal. We should only aim at increasing confidence in our beliefs, by collecting further evidence or checking our calculations. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.6) | |
A reaction: This is mainly aimed at pragmatists, but Davidson obviously subscribes (as do I) to their fallibilist view of knowledge. |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Correspondence, while it is empty as a definition, does capture the thought that truth depends on how the world is. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16) | |
A reaction: Just don't try to give a precise account of the correspondence between two things (thoughts and facts) which are so utterly different in character. |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11) | |
A reaction: Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number. |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Disquotation cannot pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains the object language. Neither can contain their own truth predicate. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.10) | |
A reaction: Presumably more sophisticated and complete accounts would need a further account of translation between languages - which explains Quine's interest in that topic. […see this essay, p.12] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
Full Idea: Felix Klein's so-called 'Erlangerprogramm' in geometry involved characterizing the various branches of geometry by what transformations were irrelevant to each. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.137) |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
Full Idea: My main objection to Fine's notion of grounding as fundamental is that it violates 'purity' - that fundamental truths should involve only fundamental notions. | |
From: comment on Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.2 | |
A reaction: [p.106 of Sider for 'purity'] The point here is that to define a grounding relation you have to mention the 'higher' levels of the relationship (as in a 'city' being grounded in physical stuff), which doesn't seem fundamental enough. |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
Full Idea: When p 'grounds' q then q holds in virtue of p's holding; q's holding is nothing beyond p's holding; the truth of p explains the truth of q in a particularly tight sense (explanation of q by p in this sense requires that p necessitates q). | |
From: report of Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 15-16) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.1 | |
A reaction: This proposal has become a hot topic in current metaphysics, as attempts are made to employ 'grounding' in various logical, epistemological and ontological contexts. I'm a fan - it is at the heart of metaphysics as structure of reality. |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following 'canonical' form: Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U... (where S, T, U... are particular sentences). | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The point here is that grounding is to be undestood in terms of sentences (and 'its being the case that...'), rather than in terms of objects, properties or relations. Fine thus makes grounding a human activity, rather than a natural activity. |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: One line of reduction is logical analysis. To say one sentence reduces to another is to say that they express the same proposition (or fact), but the grammatical form of the second is closer to the logical form than the grammatical form of the first. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Fine objects that S-and-T reduces to S and T, which is two propositions. He also objects that this approach misses the de re ingredient in reduction (that it is about the things themselves, not the sentences). It also overemphasises logical form. |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A second line of reduction is semantic, and holds in virtue of the meaning of the sentences. It should then be possible to acquire an understanding of the reduced sentence on the basis of understanding the sentences to which it reduces. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Fine says this avoids the first objection to the grammatical approach (see Reaction to Idea 15050), but still can't handle the de re aspect of reduction. Fine also doubts whether this understanding qualifies as 'reduction'. |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The third, more recent, approach to reduction is a modal matter. A class of propositions will reduce to - or supervene upon - another if, necessarily, any truth from the one is entailed by truths from the other. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Armstrong, Chalmers and Jackson for this approach] Fine notes that some people reject supervenience as a sort of reduction. He objects that this reduction doesn't necessarily lead to something more basic. |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The notion of ground should be distinguished from the strict notion of reduction. A statement of reduction implies the unreality of what is reduced, but a statement of ground does not. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: That seems like a bit of a caricature of reduction. If you see a grey cloud and it reduces to a swarm of mosquitoes, you do not say that the cloud was 'unreal'. Fine is setting up a stall for 'ground' in the metaphysical market. We all seek structure. |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Yellow' and 'water' are mass terms, concerned only with spread; 'apple' and 'square' are terms of divided reference, concerned with both spread and individuation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.124) | |
A reaction: Would you like some apple? Pass me that water. It is helpful to see that it is a requirement of 'individuation' that is missing from terms for stuff. |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Questions of what is real are to be settled upon the basis of considerations of ground. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: This looks like being one of Fine's most important ideas, which is shifting the whole basis of contemporary metaphysics. Only Parmenides and Heidegger thought Being was the target. Aristotle aims at identity. What grounds what is a third alternative. |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The first main approach says metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'objective' or 'factual'. ...According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'irreducible' or 'fundamental'. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Fine is defending the 'fundamental' approach, via the 'grounding' relation. The whole structure, though, seems to be reality. In particular, a complete story must include the relations which facilitate more than mere fundamentals. |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We may grant that some things are explanatorily more basic than others, but why should that make them more real? | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8) | |
A reaction: This is the question asked by the 'quietist'. Fine's answer is that our whole conception of Reality, with its intrinsic structure, is what lies at the basis, and this is primitive. |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I conclude that there is a primitive metaphysical concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine offers arguments to support his claim, but it seems hard to disagree with. The only alternative I can see is to understand reality in terms of our experiences, and this is the road to metaphysical hell. |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If we try to provide a serious semantics for reference to facts, we discover that they melt into one; there is no telling them apart. The relevant argument (the 'Slingshot') was credited to Frege by Alonso Church. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.5) | |
A reaction: This sounds like good grounds for not attempting to be too precise. 'There are bluebells in my local wood' identifies a fact by words, but even an animal can distinguish this fact. Only a logician dreams of making its content precise. |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
Full Idea: Once we can legitimize a disposition term by defining the relevant similarity standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so by-pass the similarity. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.135) | |
A reaction: I love mechanisms, but can we characterise mechanisms without mentioning powers and dispositions? Quine's dream is to eliminate 'similarity'. |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
Full Idea: Intuitively, what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to them. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.130) | |
A reaction: If you can judge that the similar things 'will' dissolve, you can cut to the chase and judge that this thing will dissolve. |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: As long as colour terms pick out fundamental physical properties, I would be willing to countenance their use in the description of Reality in itself, ..even if they are based on a peculiar form of sensory awareness. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to explain why metaphysicians are so fond of using colour as their example of a property, when it seems rather subjective. There seem to be good reasons for rejecting Fine's view. |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
Full Idea: Sciences differ from common sense only in the degree of methodological sophistication. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.129) | |
A reaction: Science is normal thinking about the world, but it is teamwork, with the bar set very high. |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
Full Idea: Induction expresses our hopes that similar causes will have similar effects. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125) | |
A reaction: Some top philosophers are also top teachers, and Quine was one of them, in his writings. He boils it down for the layman. Once again, he is pointing to the fundamental role of the similarity relation. |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
Full Idea: Induction is essentially only more of the same: animal expectation or habit formation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125) | |
A reaction: My working definition of induction is 'learning from experience', but that doesn't disagree with Quine. Lipton has a richer account of different types of induction. Quine's point is that it rests on resemblance. |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
Full Idea: What makes Goodman's example a puzzle is the dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. It might be best expressed as revealing a problem with sortal terms, as employed by Geach, or by Wiggins. Grue is a bit silly, but sortals are subject to convention and culture. 'Natural' properties seem needed. |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The main sources of evidence for judgments of ground are intuitive and explanatory. The relationship of ground is a form of explanation, ..explaining what makes a proposition true, which needs simplicity, breadth, coherence, non-circularity and strength. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: My thought is that not only must grounding explain, and therefore be a good explanation, but that the needs of explanation drive our decisions about what are the grounds. It is a bit indeterminate which is tail and which is dog. |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. ...It is the ultimate form of explanation. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: To be 'ultimate' that which grounds would have to be something which thwarted all further explanation. Popper, for example, got quite angry at the suggestion that we should put a block on further investigation in this way. |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
Full Idea: The usual general term, whether a common noun or a verb or an adjective, owes its generality to some resemblance among the things referred to. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116) | |
A reaction: Quine has a nice analysis of the basic role of similarity in a huge amount of supposedly strict scientific thought. |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
Full Idea: According to the 'respects' view, our learning of yellow by ostension would have depended on our first having been told or somehow apprised that it was going to be a question of color. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.122) | |
A reaction: Quine suggests there is just one notion of similarity, and respects can be 'abstracted' afterwards. Even the ontologically ruthless Quine admits psychological abstraction! |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
Full Idea: A standard of similarity is in some sense innate. The spacing of qualities (such as red, pink and blue) can be explored and mapped in the laboratory by experiments. They are needed for all learning. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.123) | |
A reaction: This reasserts Hume's original point in more scientific terms. It is one of the undeniable facts about our perceptions of qualities and properties, no matter how platonist your view of universals may be. |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
Full Idea: Things are similar to the extent that they are interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.134) | |
A reaction: This is a major idea for Quine, because it is a means to gradually eliminate the fuzzy ideas of 'resemblance' or 'similarity' or 'natural kind' from science. I love it! Two tigers are same insofar as they are substitutable. |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is clear that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would be true understands that sentence, …and if someone does not know under what conditions it would be true then they do not understand it. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13) | |
A reaction: I've always subscribed to this view. Langauge is meaningless if you can't relate it to reality, and I don't think there could be a language without an intuitive notion of truth. |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It may be that sentences are used as they are because of their truth conditions, and they have the truth conditions they do because of how they are used. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13) | |
A reaction: I've always taken the attempt to explain meaning by use as absurd. It is similar to trying to explain mind in terms of function. In each case, what is the intrinsic nature of the thing, which makes that use or that function possible? |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Projectible' predicates are predicates F and G whose shared instances all do count, for whatever reason, towards confirmation of 'All F are G'. ….A projectible predicate is one that is true of all and only the things of a kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.115-6) | |
A reaction: Both Quine and Goodman are infuriatingly brief about the introduction of this concept. 'Red' is true of all ripe tomatoes, but not 'only' of them. Hardly any predicates are true only of one kind. Is that a scholastic 'proprium'? |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A proposition essentially contains a given constituent if its replacement by some other constituent induces a shift in truth value. Thus Socrates is essential to the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher, but not to Socrates is self-identical. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: In this view the replacement of 'is' by 'isn't' would make 'is' (or affirmation) part of the essence of most propositions. This is about linguistic essence, rather than real essence. It has the potential to be trivial. Replace 'slightly' by 'fairly'? |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
Full Idea: The concept of natural kinds was reintroduced by Quine, who may now regret the way it has become a stand-in for the dubious but covertly popular concept of essences. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.2 n2 | |
A reaction: He is right that Quine would regret it, and he is right that we can't assume that there are necessary essences just because there seem to be stable natural kinds, but personally I am an essentialist, so I'm not that bothered. |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
Full Idea: If similarity has no degrees there is no containing of kinds within broader kinds. If colored things are a kind, they are similar, but red things are too narrow for a kind. If red things are a kind, colored things are not similar, and it's too broad. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.118) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I'm on Quine's side with this. We glibly talk of 'kinds', but the criteria for sorting things into kinds seems to be a mess. Quine goes on to offer a better account than the (diadic, yes-no) one rejected here. |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
Full Idea: With the triadic relation of comparative similarity, kinds can contain one another, as well as overlapping. Red and colored things can both count as kinds. Colored things all resemble one another, even though less than red things do. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.119) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Quine claims that comparative similarity is necessary for kinds - that there be some 'foil' in a similarity - that A is more like C than B is. |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
Full Idea: If kinds are based on similarity, this has the Imperfect Community problem. Red round, red wooden and round wooden things all resemble one another somehow. There may be nothing outside the set resembling them, so it meets the definition of kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.120) | |
A reaction: [ref. to Goodman 'Structure' 2nd 163- , which attacks Carnap on this] This suggests an invocation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, which won't be much help for natural kinds. |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
Full Idea: Why there have been regularities is an obscure question, for it is hard to see what would count as an answer. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126) | |
A reaction: This is the standard pessimism of the 20th century Humeans, but it strikes me as comparable to the pessimism about science found in Locke and Hume. Regularities are explained all the time by scientists, though the lowest level may be hopeless. |