Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'The Essence of Reference' and 'Political Liberalism'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

10429	It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: It is better to say that 'For all x ("Hesperus" stands for x iff x = Hesperus)', than to say '"Hesperus" stands for Hesperus', since then the expression can be a name with no bearer (e.g. "Vulcan").
	From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.2)
	A reaction: In cases where it is unclear whether the name actually designates something, it seems desirable that the name is at least allowed to function semantically.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

10425	Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Almost everyone agrees that intelligible definite descriptions may lack a referent; this has historically been a reason for not counting them among referring expressions.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.2)
	A reaction: One might compare indexicals such as 'I', which may be incapable of failing to refer when spoken. However 'look at that!' frequently fails to communicate reference.

10438	Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Definite descriptions used with referential intentions (usually in subject position) are normally rigid, ..but in predicate position they are normally not rigid, because there is no referential intention.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.5)
	A reaction: 'The man in the blue suit is the President' seems to fit, but 'The President is the head of state' doesn't. Seems roughly right, but language is always too complex for philosophers.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

10432	A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: A baptism which, perhaps through some radical mistake, is the baptism of nothing, is as good a propagator of a new use as a baptism of an object.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.3)
	A reaction: An obvious example might be the Loch Ness Monster. There is something intuitively wrong about saying that physical objects are actually part of linguistic meaning or reference. I am not a meaning!

19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference

10434	Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: A large range of expressions can be used with referential intentions, including quantifier phrases (as in 'someone has once again failed to close the door properly').
	From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.5)
	A reaction: This is the pragmatic aspect of reference, where it can be achieved by all sorts of means. But are quantifiers inherently referential in their semantic function? Some of each, it seems.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

21051	Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
	Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion?
	From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10
	A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution?

24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract

21119	Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
	Full Idea: Exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to reason.
	From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.217), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02
	A reaction: This is not the actual endorsement of Rousseau, or the tacit endorsement of Locke (by living there), but adds a Kantian appeal to a rational consensus, on which rational people should converge. Very Enlightenment. 'Hypothetical consent'.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function

10431	Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: On one common use of the notion of a function, something can possess a function which it does not, or even cannot, perform. A malformed heart is to pump blood, even if such a heart cannot in fact pump blood.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.2)
	A reaction: One might say that the heart in a dead body had the function of pumping blood, but does it still have that function? Do I have the function of breaking the world 100 metres record, even though I can't quite manage it? Not that simple.