Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types', 'The Mengzi (Mencius)' and 'Protagoras'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
     Full Idea: To everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 332c)
     A reaction: The sort of thing for which a modern philosopher would demand a proof (and then reject when the proof couldn't be found), where a Greek is happy to assert it as self-evident. I can't think of a counterexample.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if it is true, the ramification it is meant to cope with was pointless to begin with.
     From: Willard Quine (Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types [1967], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1
     A reaction: Maddy says the rejection of Reducibility collapsed the ramified theory of types into the simple theory.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
     Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 330c)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: It would be shameful indeed to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 352d)
     A reaction: He lumps wisdom and knowledge together, and I think we can take 'knowledge' to mean something like understanding, because obviously mere atomistic propositional knowledge can be utterly trivial.
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only real kind of faring ill is the loss of knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 345b)
     A reaction: This must crucially involve the intellectualist view (of Socrates) that virtuos behaviour results from knowledge, and moral wickedness is the result of ignorance. It is hard to see how forgetting a phone number is evil.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything resembles everything else up to a point.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 331d)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
     Full Idea: Knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 360d)
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: If the King has a great fondness for music, then perhaps there is hope for the state of Ch'i.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be Shakespeare's attitude to music as well. The general idea must be that love of music requires a selfless state of mind, where the mind revels in the beauty of something outside of itself. Respect is the desirable result.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human nature is naturally compassionate and good (as a 'sprout'), but people may not be good [Mengzi (Mencius), by Norden]
     Full Idea: Mengzi does not claim that humans are innately good; he claims that human nature is innately good. …He says that 'the heart of compassion' (manifested when anyone sees a child about to fall into a well) is the 'sprout of benevolence'.
     From: report of Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.II
     A reaction: There is a nice distinction here between the 'sprout' of human nature and the finished product. Seeds have the potential to produce tall healthy plants, but circumstances can warp them.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: People all have things they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 7B31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.IV
     A reaction: Very nice! Kekes points out the enormous importance of unthinkable deeds. Depravity is when the unthinkable gradually begins to look possible, which is probably a social phenomenon, a creeping cancer in a culture.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 358d)
     A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'Do you mean by good those things that are beneficial to men?' 'Not only those. I call some things which are not beneficial good as well'.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 333e)
     A reaction: Examples needed, but this would be bad news for utilitarians. Good health is not seen as beneficial if it is taken for granted. Not being deaf.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: There are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 351d)
     A reaction: Sadism and child birth. Though Bentham (I think) says that there is nothing good about the pain, since the event would obviously be better without it.
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only reason the common man disapproves of pleasures is if they lead to pain and deprive us of future pleasures.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 354a)
     A reaction: Plato has a strong sense that some pleasures are just innately depraved and wicked. If those pleasure don't hurt anyone, it is very hard to pinpoint what is wrong with them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b)
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b)
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each correct feeling relies on an underlying virtue [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 6A6), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.III
     A reaction: 'Disdain' seems to be the response to anyone who is disrespectful. Note that wisdom concerns judgements. Respect seems to be more of a social convention than an actual concern for others.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: If two soldiers were fleeing from a battle, and one stopped after a hundred paces and the other stopped after a fifty paces, what would you think if the latter, as one who only ran fifty paces, were to laugh at the former who ran a hundred?
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.3)
     A reaction: A nice illustration, in my view, of the universality of truths about human virtue. In no culture would this laughter be appropriate. Nevertheless, there must be degrees of dishonour. Better to flee than join in with the likely winners.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: If you shared your enjoyment of music or of hunting with the people, you would be a true King.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is a great truth for dictators and traditional monarchs. One pictures the successful ones attending public entertainments, and allowing the public to see their own. Tyrants keep entertainment private. Nero is a counterexample!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families. Treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age, and extend this to the young of other families.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7)
     A reaction: This seems to me to articulate the ideal of communitarianism very nicely. Morality is not just about healthy adults in war and peace. It must include the children and the old. The values of the family are above the values of contracts and calculations.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: When close attendants say a man deserves death, do not listen; when all the councillors say so, do not listen; when everyone says so, have the case investigated. If he is guilty, put him to death; he was put to death by the whole country.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.7)
     A reaction: The jury system is a gesture in this direction. Compare Idea 95. In Mencius's time, no doubt, everyone believed that capital punishment was sometimes right. Nowadays, when many people (e.g. me) reject it, the procedure won't work.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: Your desire to extend your territory by war, in order to bring peace, is like looking for fish by climbing a tree.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7)
     A reaction: Mencius had a flair for analogies. Just occasionally I suppose he might be wrong on this point, but I would think that experiments in the laboratory of history have shown that he is right in nearly all cases.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: Once a gentleman has seen animals alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. That is why the gentleman keeps his distance from the kitchen.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7)
     A reaction: If you applied this to a Gestapo officer and his victims, it would obviously be the epitome of wickedness. But it is complex. Compassion is expected when we encounter suffering, but we are not obliged to seek out suffering. Or are we?