Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'From Stimulus to Science', 'The Logical Basis of Metaphysics' and 'Minds, Brains and Science'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
6564 To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine]
     Full Idea: To affirm a compound of the form 'p and not-p' is just to have mislearned one or both of these particles.
     From: Willard Quine (From Stimulus to Science [1995], p.23), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: Quoted by Fogelin. This summarises the view of logic developed by the young Wittgenstein, that logical terms are 'operators', rather than referring terms. Of course the speaker may have a compartmentalised mind, or not understand 'p' properly.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18801 Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett]
     Full Idea: Explanations of classical negation assume that knowing what it is for the truth-condition of some statement to obtain, independently of recognising it to obtain, we thereby know what it is for it NOT to obtain; but this presupposes classical negation.
     From: Michael Dummett (The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [1991], p.299), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.1
     A reaction: [compressed wording] This is Dummett explaining why he prefers intuitionistic logic, with its doubts about double negation.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
2427 Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
     Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
     From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
     A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.
7389 A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
     Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily.
     From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
     A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does.
7390 If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
     Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
     From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
     A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.