Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Discipline and Punish' and 'Modal Logic'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K

14970	Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: Normal propositional modal logics derive from the minimal system K: wffs of PC are axioms; □(p⊃q)⊃(□p⊃□q); uniform substitution; modus ponens; necessitation (α→□α).
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1)

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D

14971	D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: If a frame contains any dead end or blind world, then D is not valid on that frame, ...but D is valid on every serial frame.
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.1)

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4

14972	S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: In S4 there are exactly 14 distinct modalities, and any modality may be reduced to one containing no more than three modal operators in sequence.
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
	A reaction: The significance of this may be unclear, but it illustrates one of the rewards of using formal systems to think about modal problems. There is at least an appearance of precision, even if it is only conditional precision.

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5

14973	In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: S5 contains the four main reduction laws, so the first of any pair of operators may be deleted. Hence all but the last modal operator may be deleted. This leaves six modalities: p, ◊p, □p, and their negations.
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula

14976	Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: If one wants the quantifiers in each world to range only over the things that exist in that world, and one doesn't believe that the same things exist in every world, one would probably not want the Barcan formula.
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.2)
	A reaction: I haven't quite got this, but it sounds to me like I should reject the Barcan formula (but Idea 9449!). I like a metaphysics to rest on the actual world (with modal properties). I assume different things could have existed, but don't.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation

14974	A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc.
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
	A reaction: If a thing has a relation to two separate things, then those two things will also have that relation between them. If I am in the same family as Jim and as Jill, then Jim and Jill are in the same family.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality

14975	A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
	Full Idea: A de dicto necessary truth says that something is φ, that this proposition is a necessary truth, i.e. that in every accessible world something (but not necessarily the same thing in each world) is φ.
	From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.1)
	A reaction: At last, a really clear and illuminating account of this term! The question is then invited of what is the truthmaker for a de dicto truth, assuming that the objects themselves are truthmakers for de re truths.

24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation

21947	Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
	Full Idea: Foucault's analysis suggests that meaningful revolution, hence genuine liberation, is impossible: the only alternative to the modern net of micro-centres of power is totalitatian domination. Hence his politics, even when revolutionary, is always local.
	From: report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
	A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this.

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle

21946	Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
	Full Idea: Foucault's thesis is that disciplinary techniques introduced for criminals became the model for other modern sites of control (schools, hospitals, factories), so that prison discipline pervades all of society.
	From: report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
	A reaction: Someone recently designed Foucault Monopoly, where every location is a prison. All tightly controlled organisations, such as a medieval monastery, or the Roman army, will inevitably share many features.