Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Professor Marcus', 'Inverted Earth' and 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
     Full Idea: The second half of the twentieth century has seen the development of a vastly more sophisticated sense of logical form, as applied to natural languages.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.462)
     A reaction: Burge cites this as one of the three big modern developments (along with the critique of logical positivism, and direct reference/anti-individualism). Vagueness may be the last frontier for this development.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
     Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to.
     From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183)
     A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
     Full Idea: Anti-individualism is the view that not all of an individual's mental states and events can be type-individuated independently of the nature of the entities in the individual's physical or social environment environment.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.453)
     A reaction: While the Twin Earth experiment emphasises the physical environment, Burge has been responsible for emphasising the social environment. The suspicion is that the whole concept of 'individual' minds will collapse on this view.
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
     Full Idea: Certain thought experiments made trouble for standard functionalism, which limits input/output to the surface of an individual; proposals to extend this into the environment reduces the reliance on a computer paradigm, but increases complexity.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.454)
     A reaction: [He has the Twin Earth experiment in mind] The jury is out on this, but it looks a bit of a slippery slope. Accounts of action and responsibility need a fairly sharp concept of an individual. Externalism begins to look like just a new scepticism.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Block's Inverted Earth example (with matching inversion of both colours and colour-language) tries to show a variation of representational properties without a variation of phenomenal properties, so that the latter are not constituted by the former.
     From: report of Ned Block (Inverted Earth [1990]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.7
     A reaction: (The example is actually quite complex). This type of argument - a thought experiment in which qualia are held steady while everything else varies, or vice versa - seems to be the only way that we can possibly get at an assessment of the role of qualia.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
     Full Idea: The idea of anti-individualism raised problems about self-knowledge. The question is whether anti-individualism is compatible with some sort of authoritative or privileged warrant for certain types of self-knowledge.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.457)
     A reaction: [See under 'Nature of Minds' for 'Anti-individualism'] The thought is that if your mind is not entirely in your head, you can no longer be an expert on it. It might go the other way: obviously we can be self-experts, so anti-individualism is wrong.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
     Full Idea: There appear to be qualitative aspects of experience that have no function in the life of the organism. They constitute dysfunction or noise. Blurriness in a visual experience is an example.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.460)
     A reaction: The best account of blurred vision would seem to be adverbial - I see 'in a blurred way' (nay, blurredly). Hence maybe blurred vision is functional, but it just isn't functioning very well.