Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Anselm's Argument' and 'A Dictionary of Philosophy'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6455	Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey]
	Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey).
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data

6453	Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
	Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects.
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them?

6454	Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
	Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what?
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof

1422	God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm]
	Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.
	From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2)
	A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely?