7920
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Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.
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7922
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Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.
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7921
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Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless.
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14296
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Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
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Full Idea:
Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
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A reaction:
A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
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9282
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I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
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A reaction:
A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?
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7091
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The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
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Full Idea:
The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
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From:
A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.
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