8348
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If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
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A reaction:
He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous.
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18967
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A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
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Full Idea:
A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
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From:
Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
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A reaction:
Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.
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18968
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The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
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Full Idea:
The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
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A reaction:
If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.
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4125
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Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
In Hare's theory I apply a "role-reversal test", and then acquire an actual agglomeration of preferences that apply to the hypothetical situation. The result is utilitarianism.
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From:
report of Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
It hits that traditional stumbling block, of why I should care about the preferences of others. Pure reason and empathy are the options (Kant or Hume). I may, however, lack both.
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4126
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If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
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Full Idea:
Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
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From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?
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4127
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If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
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Full Idea:
If there is to be total identification with others, then if another's preferences are mistaken, the preferences I imagine myself into are equally mistaken, and if 'identification' is the point, they should remain mistaken.
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From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
Yes. The core of morality must be judgement. Robots can implement universal utilitarian rules, but they could end up promoting persecutions of minorities.
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22483
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A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
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Full Idea:
We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some person R, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely.
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From:
Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], p.21), quoted by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.190
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A reaction:
Foot offers this as Hare's most explicit definition. The use of algebra strikes me as ludicrous. In logic letters have the virtue of not shifting their meaning during an argument, but that is not required here.
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10371
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Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
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A reaction:
I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view.
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8346
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Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
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From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
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A reaction:
If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?
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