Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Opus Maius (major works)' and 'Does moral phil rest on a mistake?'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics

9261	The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
	Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism

9262	The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
	Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique

9260	Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
	Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

9259	We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
	Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

9258	If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
	Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4)
	A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences

16745	No one even knows the nature and properties of a fly - why it has that colour, or so many feet [Bacon,R]
	Full Idea: No one is so wise regarding the natural world as to know with certainty all the truths that concern the nature and properties of a single fly, or to know the proper causes of its color and why it has so many feet, neither more nor less.
	From: Roger Bacon (Opus Maius (major works) [1254], I.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
	A reaction: Pasnau quotes this in the context of 'occult' qualities. It is scientific essentialism, because Bacon clearly takes it that the explanation of these things would be found within the essence of the fly, if we could only get at it.