Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?' and 'There is No A Priori (and reply)'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Kripke proposes that the substitutional quantifier is not a replacement for, or in competition with, the standard interpretation.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Problem about Substitutional Quantification? [1976]) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers p.165
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
     A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
     Full Idea: What non-experiential link to reality could support insights into its necessary character?
     From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 4)
     A reaction: The key to it, I think, is your theory of mind. If you are a substance dualist, then connecting to such deep things looks fine, but if you are a reductive physicalist then it looks absurdly hopeful.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
     Full Idea: It is overwhelmingly plausible that some knowledge is empirical. The attractive thesis of naturalism is that all knowledge is; there is only one way of knowing.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: How many ways for us to know seems to depend on what faculties we have. We lump our senses together under a single heading. The arrival of data is not the same as the arrival of knowledge. I'm unconvinced that naturalists like me must accept this.