6844
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Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
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A reaction:
He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.
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6835
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German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
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A reaction:
He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.
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6837
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Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
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A reaction:
I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.
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6845
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Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
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A reaction:
From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.
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14296
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Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
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Full Idea:
Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
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A reaction:
A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
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10415
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Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
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Full Idea:
On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification.
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From:
report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties
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A reaction:
(For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising.
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6843
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Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
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A reaction:
This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.
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