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6844
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Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
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A reaction:
He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.
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6835
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German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
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A reaction:
He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.
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6837
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Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
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A reaction:
I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.
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6845
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Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
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A reaction:
From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.
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6862
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Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
Fuzzy logic is based on a continuum of degrees of truth, but it is committed to the idea that it is half-true that one identical twin is tall and the other twin is not, even though they are the same height.
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.154)
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A reaction:
Maybe to be shocked by a contradiction is missing the point of fuzzy logic? Half full is the same as half empty. The logic does not say the twins are different, because it is half-true that they are both tall, and half-true that they both aren't.
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14296
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Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
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Full Idea:
Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
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A reaction:
A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
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6861
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What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
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A reaction:
This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.
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6860
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How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
If one takes a spectrum of colours from yellow to red, it might be that given a series of colour samples along that spectrum, each sample is indiscriminable by the naked eye from the next one, though samples at either end are blatantly different.
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151)
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A reaction:
This seems like a nice variant of the Sorites paradox (Idea 6008). One could demonstrate it with just three samples, where A and C seemed different from each other, but other comparisons didn't.
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6843
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Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
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A reaction:
This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.
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