Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Negative Dialectics' and 'Intending'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy

20435	If philosophy could be summarised it would be pointless [Adorno]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is in essence not summarisable. Otherwise it would be superfluous; that most of it allows its to be summarised speaks against it.
	From: Theodor W. Adorno (Negative Dialectics [1966], p.34), quoted by Gerhard Richter - Benjamin and Adorno 3
	A reaction: This seems contradict the Cicero quotation which I take to be the epigraph of my collection of ideas. Adorno has a very 'continental' view, placing philosophy much closer to poetry (Heidegger's later view) than to science. Not like advocacy either.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions

20076	An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
	Full Idea: We can identify an intentional action ...with an all-out conditional judgement that the action is desirable. ...In the case of pure intending, I now suggest that the intention simply is an all-out judgement.
	From: Donald Davidson (Intending [1978], p.99), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
	A reaction: 'Pure' intending seems to be what Stout calls 'prior' intending, which is clearer. This still strikes me as obviously false. I judge that it is desirable that I make a cup of coffee, but secretly I'm hoping someone else will make it for me.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions

20024	Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
	Full Idea: Later Davidson dropped his reductive treatment of intentions (in terms of 'pro-attitudes' and other beliefs), and accepted that intentions are irreducible, and distinct from pro-attitudes.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Intending [1978]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
	A reaction: Only a philosopher would say that intentions cannot be reduced to something else. Since I have a very physicalist view of the mind, I incline to reduce them to powers and dispositions of physical matter.