16766
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One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2
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A reaction:
This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'.
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7590
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Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics).
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism')
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A reaction:
These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two?
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7589
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Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine.
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism')
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A reaction:
The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer.
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7593
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Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality.
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From:
report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result.
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7587
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The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated.
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion')
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A reaction:
This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'.
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