Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Elements of Mind' and 'On Human Nature'

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73 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
     Full Idea: I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat. …There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126)
     A reaction: Philosophy is generalisation. Science holds the upper hand, because it settles the subject-matter to be generalised.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
     Full Idea: The theory of descriptions gives a model of internalist intentionality, in that it describes cases where the thinkability of a belief does not depend on the existence of a specific object.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.36)
     A reaction: So what do externalists say about the theory? Surely a reference to 'water' can't entail the existence of water?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
     Full Idea: Felix Klein's so-called 'Erlangerprogramm' in geometry involved characterizing the various branches of geometry by what transformations were irrelevant to each.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.137)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes said that the aesthetic properties of a thing supervene on its physical properties.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16)
     A reaction: A confusing example, as aesthetic properties only exist if there is an observer. Is 'supervenience' just an empty locution which tries to avoid reduction?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
     Full Idea: A statue is constituted by the marble that makes it up. It is plausible to say that constitution is not the same as identity - since identity is symmetrical and identity is not - but nonetheless constitution is a supervenience relation.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16)
     A reaction: So what makes it a statue, as opposed to a piece of marble? It may well be an abstraction which only exists relative to observers.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
     Full Idea: 'Yellow' and 'water' are mass terms, concerned only with spread; 'apple' and 'square' are terms of divided reference, concerned with both spread and individuation.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.124)
     A reaction: Would you like some apple? Pass me that water. It is helpful to see that it is a requirement of 'individuation' that is missing from terms for stuff.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
     Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant.
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
     Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
     Full Idea: Properties are causes.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17)
     A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
     Full Idea: Once we can legitimize a disposition term by defining the relevant similarity standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so by-pass the similarity.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.135)
     A reaction: I love mechanisms, but can we characterise mechanisms without mentioning powers and dispositions? Quine's dream is to eliminate 'similarity'.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
     Full Idea: Intuitively, what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to them.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.130)
     A reaction: If you can judge that the similar things 'will' dissolve, you can cut to the chase and judge that this thing will dissolve.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane]
     Full Idea: The traditional concept of substance says substances bear properties which are distinct from them, and substances are capable of independent existence.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.9)
     A reaction: Put like that, it sounds ridiculous as a physical theory. It is hard to dislodge substance, though, from a priori human metaphysics.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
     Full Idea: The beliefs that are currently guiding your actions do not need to be in your stream of consciousness, which suggests that beliefs do not need to be conscious at all.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.31)
     A reaction: Too bold, I think. Presumably this would eliminate all the other propositional attitudes from consciousness. There would only be qualia left!
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers have claimed that there are two kinds of belief, 'de re' belief and 'de dicto' belief.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.35)
     A reaction: Interesting, though it may only distinguish two objects of belief, not two types. Internalist and externalist views are implied.
Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1)
     A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane]
     Full Idea: There are plenty of cases of knowing how to do something, where that knowledge can also be expressed - without remainder, as it were - in propositional terms (such as knowing how to get to the Albert Hall).
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28)
     A reaction: Presumably all knowing how could be expressed propositionally by God.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
     Full Idea: Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless. Is it really bitter, or really tasteless?
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44)
     A reaction: A nice reinforcement of a classic Greek question. Good support for the primary/secondary distinction. Common sense, really.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane]
     Full Idea: The traditional examples used to support the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43)
     A reaction: Presumably, though, direct realists can move one eye, or having something wrong with a retina.
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane]
     Full Idea: One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42)
     A reaction: …so sense data are optional? We create sense data by objectifying them, but animals just taste the wine, and are direct realists. Tasting the sourness seems to be a case of abstraction.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
     Full Idea: The solution to the problem of perception is to deny that it is related to real objects (things or sense-data); rather, perception is an intentional state (with a subject, mode and content), a relation to the intentional content.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42)
     A reaction: Not clear. This definition makes it sound like a propositional attitude.
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
     Full Idea: Visual perception seems to differ from some of the other senses; when we become aware of burning toast, we become aware of the smell, ...but we don't see a garden by seeing a 'look' of the garden.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.40)
     A reaction: Interesting. Do blind people transfer this more direct perception to a different sense (e.g. the one they rely on most)?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
     Full Idea: The richness in information of perceptual experience outruns our modes of description of it, which has led some philosophers to claim that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.45)
     A reaction: It certainly implies that it can't be entirely conceptual, but it still may be that in humans concepts are always involved. Not when I'm waking up in the morning, though.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane]
     Full Idea: The Adverbial Theory of perception holds that the predicates which other theories take as picking out the properties of objects are really adverbs of the perceptual verb; ..instead of strange objects, we just have properties of experiences.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42)
     A reaction: Promising. It fits secondary qualities all right, but what about primary? I 'see bluely', but can I 'see squarely'?
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
     Full Idea: It is controversial whether knowledge is a state of mind, or a composite state involving a thought about something, plus its existence.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.5)
     A reaction: Pinpoints the internalism/externalism problem. Knowledge is a special type of belief (but maybe belief with external links!). Tricky. I vote for internalism.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
     Full Idea: Sciences differ from common sense only in the degree of methodological sophistication.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.129)
     A reaction: Science is normal thinking about the world, but it is teamwork, with the bar set very high.
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
     Full Idea: Induction expresses our hopes that similar causes will have similar effects.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125)
     A reaction: Some top philosophers are also top teachers, and Quine was one of them, in his writings. He boils it down for the layman. Once again, he is pointing to the fundamental role of the similarity relation.
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
     Full Idea: Induction is essentially only more of the same: animal expectation or habit formation.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125)
     A reaction: My working definition of induction is 'learning from experience', but that doesn't disagree with Quine. Lipton has a richer account of different types of induction. Quine's point is that it rests on resemblance.
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
     Full Idea: What makes Goodman's example a puzzle is the dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116)
     A reaction: Illuminating. It might be best expressed as revealing a problem with sortal terms, as employed by Geach, or by Wiggins. Grue is a bit silly, but sortals are subject to convention and culture. 'Natural' properties seem needed.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
     Full Idea: The three arguments that have been used to articulate the problem of consciousness are the knowledge argument ('Mary'), the possibility of 'zombies' (creatures like us but lacking phenomenal consciousness), and the explanatory gap (the Hard Question).
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26)
     A reaction: All of these push towards the implausible claim that there could never be a physical explanation of why we experience things. Zombies are impossible, in my opinion.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
     Full Idea: Intentionalism (the doctrine that all mental states are intentional) need not be the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.22)
     A reaction: This points to the requirement for an intentionalist to prove that so-called 'qualia' states are essentially intentional, which is not implausible.
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
     Full Idea: Love, hate, and the other object-directed attitudes have as much of a role in explaining behaviour as the propositional attitudes.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.34)
     A reaction: A good clarification of the range of intentional states. Objects seem to be external, where propositions are clearly internal.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
     Full Idea: There is a phenomenal difference between a short-sighted person wearing glasses and not; they do not judge that the world is different, but the properties of the experience (the qualia) have changed.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43)
     A reaction: Could be challenged. If a notice becomes unreadable, that is more than the qualia changing.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
     Full Idea: The intentional object of a pain-state is a part or region of the body, not a pain-object.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.24)
     A reaction: Plausible. Has anyone ever suffered from pain without some sense of what part of the body is actually in pain?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
     Full Idea: Weak intentionalism says all mental states are intentional, but qualia are higher-order properties of these states. ..Strong intentionalists say the phenomenal character of a sensation consists purely in that state's intentionality.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.25)
     A reaction: The weak version sounds better. Asking 'how could a thought have a quality of experience just by being about something?' is a restatement of the traditional problem, which won't go away. The Hard Question.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
     Full Idea: The right thing to say about inverted qualia is that the person's experiences are different from other people's, but their beliefs are the same.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44)
     A reaction: Right - which reinforces the idea that all beliefs are the result of judgement, and none come directly from perception.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
     Full Idea: The usual general term, whether a common noun or a verb or an adjective, owes its generality to some resemblance among the things referred to.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116)
     A reaction: Quine has a nice analysis of the basic role of similarity in a huge amount of supposedly strict scientific thought.
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
     Full Idea: According to the 'respects' view, our learning of yellow by ostension would have depended on our first having been told or somehow apprised that it was going to be a question of color.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.122)
     A reaction: Quine suggests there is just one notion of similarity, and respects can be 'abstracted' afterwards. Even the ontologically ruthless Quine admits psychological abstraction!
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
     Full Idea: A standard of similarity is in some sense innate. The spacing of qualities (such as red, pink and blue) can be explored and mapped in the laboratory by experiments. They are needed for all learning.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.123)
     A reaction: This reasserts Hume's original point in more scientific terms. It is one of the undeniable facts about our perceptions of qualities and properties, no matter how platonist your view of universals may be.
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
     Full Idea: Things are similar to the extent that they are interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.134)
     A reaction: This is a major idea for Quine, because it is a means to gradually eliminate the fuzzy ideas of 'resemblance' or 'similarity' or 'natural kind' from science. I love it! Two tigers are same insofar as they are substitutable.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
     Full Idea: It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10)
     A reaction: I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
     Full Idea: Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14)
     A reaction: I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
     Full Idea: The fundamental problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26)
     A reaction: If footprints or tree-rings are the model for reductions of intentionality, there doesn't seem much scope in them for giving false information, except by some freak event.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
     Full Idea: According to property dualism, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even though they are properties of one substance.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10)
     A reaction: Two properties may be phenomenologically different (transparent and magnetic), but that doesn't put them in different ontological categories.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
     Full Idea: While the non-reductive physicalist believes that mental/physical supervenience must be explained, the emergentist is willing to accept it as a fact of nature.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: A good reason not to be an emergentist. No philosopher should abandon the principle of sufficient reason.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
     Full Idea: If the mental supervenes on the physical, then whenever a physical cause brings about some effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17)
     A reaction: This is why supervenience seems to imply epiphenomenalism. The very concept of supervenience is dubious.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
     Full Idea: Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.19)
     A reaction: Certainly if the physical is seen as just a pile of atoms, it is hard to see how they could ever think (see idea 1909).
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
     Full Idea: If causation concerns events, then we have an identity theory of mental and physical events (particulars) [Davidson]. If causation is by properties, then it is mental and physical properties which are identical [Lewis and Armstrong].
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14)
     A reaction: Events are tokens, and properties are types. Tricky. Events are dynamic, but properties can be static.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
     Full Idea: Causal overdetermination is when an effect has more than one cause, and each event would have caused the effect if the other one had not done so.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.13)
     A reaction: Overdetermination is a symptom that an explanation is questionable, but it can occur. Two strong people can join to push over a light hatstand.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
     Full Idea: I claim that the completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.12)
     A reaction: He does not convince me of this. The mind may be within physics, but why should we say a priori that no exceptions to physical law will ever be discovered. Crane is setting up straw men.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
     Full Idea: In experience we learn propositions, since someone can reason using the sentence 'Red looks like this' (e.g. 'If red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn't').
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28)
     A reaction: The fact that we can create propositions about experiences doesn't prove that experience is inherently propositional.
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
     Full Idea: The Twin Earth argument does not refute internalism, since it depends on the 'Content-Determines-Reference' principle, which internalists can reject.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.37)
     A reaction: The idea is that content should be understood in a context (e.g. on a particular planet). Indexicals count against a totally narrow view of content (Twins thinking 'I am here').
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
     Full Idea: If a mental state is broad, then the existence of the mental state entails the existence of its object.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: Hence thinking of non-existent things like unicorns is problematic for externalists. However, externalists can think about numbers or Platonic ideals.
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
     Full Idea: Intensional contexts are those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the extensions are conceived.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.4)
     A reaction: An important distinction for anyone defending an internalist view of concepts or of knowledge
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
     Full Idea: 'Projectible' predicates are predicates F and G whose shared instances all do count, for whatever reason, towards confirmation of 'All F are G'. ….A projectible predicate is one that is true of all and only the things of a kind.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.115-6)
     A reaction: Both Quine and Goodman are infuriatingly brief about the introduction of this concept. 'Red' is true of all ripe tomatoes, but not 'only' of them. Hardly any predicates are true only of one kind. Is that a scholastic 'proprium'?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1)
     A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best…
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7)
     A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others?
Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7)
     A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
     Full Idea: The concept of natural kinds was reintroduced by Quine, who may now regret the way it has become a stand-in for the dubious but covertly popular concept of essences.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.2 n2
     A reaction: He is right that Quine would regret it, and he is right that we can't assume that there are necessary essences just because there seem to be stable natural kinds, but personally I am an essentialist, so I'm not that bothered.
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
     Full Idea: If similarity has no degrees there is no containing of kinds within broader kinds. If colored things are a kind, they are similar, but red things are too narrow for a kind. If red things are a kind, colored things are not similar, and it's too broad.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.118)
     A reaction: [compressed] I'm on Quine's side with this. We glibly talk of 'kinds', but the criteria for sorting things into kinds seems to be a mess. Quine goes on to offer a better account than the (diadic, yes-no) one rejected here.
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
     Full Idea: With the triadic relation of comparative similarity, kinds can contain one another, as well as overlapping. Red and colored things can both count as kinds. Colored things all resemble one another, even though less than red things do.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.119)
     A reaction: [compressed] Quine claims that comparative similarity is necessary for kinds - that there be some 'foil' in a similarity - that A is more like C than B is.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
     Full Idea: If kinds are based on similarity, this has the Imperfect Community problem. Red round, red wooden and round wooden things all resemble one another somehow. There may be nothing outside the set resembling them, so it meets the definition of kind.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.120)
     A reaction: [ref. to Goodman 'Structure' 2nd 163- , which attacks Carnap on this] This suggests an invocation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, which won't be much help for natural kinds.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
     Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11)
     A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
     Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14)
     A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
     Full Idea: Why there have been regularities is an obscure question, for it is hard to see what would count as an answer.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126)
     A reaction: This is the standard pessimism of the 20th century Humeans, but it strikes me as comparable to the pessimism about science found in Locke and Hume. Regularities are explained all the time by scientists, though the lowest level may be hopeless.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4)
     A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology?
Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane]
     Full Idea: The view that 'exists' is never a predicate is not plausible.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: He doesn't enlarge. Russell says 'exists' is a quantifier. 'Your very existence offends me - I hope it is confiscated'.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8)
     A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief.