75 ideas
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
Full Idea: Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.43) |
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215) |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
Full Idea: Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.26) |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference". | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135) |
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine ends up with the logic that is maximally justified by experience, ...but a large number of the core principles of logic will have to be used to select the logic that is maximally justified by experience. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954]) by Paul Boghossian - Knowledge of Logic p.233 | |
A reaction: In order to grasp some core principles of logic, you will probably need a certain amount of experience. I take logic to be an abstracted feature of reality (unless it is extended by pure fictions). Some basic logic may be hard wired in us. |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
Full Idea: Elementary logic, as commonly systematized nowadays, comprises truth-function theory (involving 'or', 'and', 'not' etc.), quantifiers (and their variables), and identity theory ('='). In addition, set theory requires classes among values of variables. | |
From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], II) | |
A reaction: Quine is famous for trying to squeeze properties out of the picture, which would then block higher-order logics (which quantify over properties). Quine's list gives a nice programme for a student of the philosophy of logic to understand. |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Quine's view of logical consequence is that it is when there is no way of uniformly substituting nonlogical expressions in the premises and consequences so that the premises all remain true but the consequence now becomes false. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], p.103) by Theodore Sider - Logic for Philosophy 1.5 | |
A reaction: One might just say that the consequence holds if you insert consistent variables for the nonlogical terms, which looks like Aristotle's view of the matter. |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110) | |
A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'. |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine said a logical truth is a truth in which only logical constants occur essentially, ...but then a fruitful definition of 'logical constant' is called for. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §02 |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine's logical argument against modality presupposes a naïve view of singular terms under which no significant distinction is to be drawn between the use of names and descriptions. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Kit Fine - Intro to 'Modality and Tense' p. 6 | |
A reaction: See Idea 9201 for Quine's argument. The question is whether '9' and 'the number of planets' are names or descriptions. The 'number of planets' is not remotely descriptive of 9, so it must be referential. So '9' is a name? Hm. |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
Full Idea: Unlike elementary logic, the truths of set theory are not obvious. Set theory was straining at the leash of intuition ever since Cantor discovered higher infinites; and with the added impetus of the paradoxes of set theory the leash snapped. | |
From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], II) | |
A reaction: This problem seems to have forced Quine into platonism about sets, because he felt they were essential for mathematics and science, but couldn't be constructed with precision. So they must be real, but we don't quite understand them. |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111) | |
A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future. |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine cannot deal with the intuition that there is a difference in kind between our knowledge of arithmetic and our knowledge of physics. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 7.5 | |
A reaction: The endorses this criticism, which she says is widespread. I'm not convinced that there is a clear notion of 'difference in kind' here. Jenkins gets arithmetic from concepts and physics from the world. Is that a sharp distinction? |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
Full Idea: We might say that set theory is not really logic, but a branch of mathematics. This would deprive 'includes' of the status of a logical word. Frege's derivation of arithmetic would then cease to count as a derivation from logic: for he used set theory. | |
From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], II) | |
A reaction: Quine has been making the point that higher infinities and the paradoxes undermine the status of set theory as logic, but he decides to continue thinking of set theory as logic. Critics of logicism frequently ask whether the reduction is to logic. |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine's advice is to countenance numbers iff the literal part of our theory quantifies over them; and to count the part of our theory that quantifies over numbers literal iff there turn out really to be numbers. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Stephen Yablo - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? XIII | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit devastating. Presumably it is indeed the choice of a best theory which results in the ontological commitment, so it is not much help to then read off the ontology from the theory. |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
Full Idea: One's hypothesis as to there being universals is at bottom just as arbitrary or pragmatic a matter as one's adoption of a new brand of set theory or even a new system of bookkeeping. | |
From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], x) | |
A reaction: This spells out clearly the strongly pragmatist vein in Quine's thinking. |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
Full Idea: The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.44) |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner of the modern notion of intension or meaning. ...Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], §1) | |
A reaction: Quine first wants to jettison de re necessity (essence of the object), by shifting it to de dicto necessity (necessity in meaning), but he subsequently rejects that as well, presumably because he doesn't even believe in meanings. |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
Full Idea: Nothing in Quine's argument seems to be said directly against the view that the propositions of logic are necessary truths, ..though Crispin Wright has represented him as saying this at the end of 'Two Dogmas'. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §3 | |
A reaction: Quine famously denies that logical truths are merely a matter of convention, so the question is, if he believes in logical necessity, what does he think is the basis of it? Answers, as always, on a postcard. |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
Full Idea: When Kant's arithmetical examples of a priori synthetic judgements were sweepingly disqualified by Frege's reduction of arithmetic to logic, attention moved to the less tendentious and logically prior question 'How is logical certainty possible?' | |
From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], I) | |
A reaction: A nice summary of the story so far, from someone who should know. This still leaves the question open of whether any synthetic truths can be derived from the logical certainties which are available. |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction sought to contract, if not to empty, the class of truths that are called necessary. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Causal and Metaphysical Necessity I | |
A reaction: The thought was that absolutely everything, including, for example, basic logic, became potentially revisable. See the last section of Quine's paper. |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252) | |
A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20) |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
Full Idea: In trying to make sense of the role of convention in a priori knowledge, the very distinction between a priori and empirical begins to waver and dissolve. | |
From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], VI) | |
A reaction: This is the next stage in the argument after Wittgenstein presents the apriori as nothing more than what arises from truth tables. The rationalists react by taking us back to the original 'natural light of reason' view. Then we go round again... |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine showed the vacuity of the metaphysical concept of analyticity and the futility of the underwritten project - the linguistic theory of necessity. But that doesn't effect the epistemic notion of analyticity needed for a priori knowledge. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered Concl | |
A reaction: This summarise Boghossian's view, that a priori knowledge is still analytic, once we get clear about analyticity. See Idea 9368 for his two types of analyticity. Horwich attacks the view. |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: The last section of Quine's article challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 04.5 | |
A reaction: That is, Quine does not deny that there are truths which rest entirely on meaning. It is a 'dogma of empiricism' that the a priori can be equated with the analytic (and the necessary). |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine's arguments provide no reason to doubt the existence of a priori knowledge outside the domain of science. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §10 | |
A reaction: This rather ignores Quine's background view of thoroughgoing physicalism, so that the domain of science is the domain of nature, which is the domain of everything. See his naturalising of epistemology, for example. Maths is part of his science. |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
Full Idea: Quine says scientific beliefs follow empirical adequacy, simplicity and conservatism; science and rationality support this view; hence any hypothesis can be abandoned to increase simplicity; so no scientific belief is a priori. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §10 | |
A reaction: [Compressed] I just don't accept this claim. If science wants to drop simple arithmetic or the laws of thought, so much the worse for science - they've obviously taken a wrong turning somewhere. We must try to infer God's logic. |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
Full Idea: I think logic, arithmetic and geometry are subject to Quine's empirical revisability argument: quantum logic may turn out to be the best overall theory; so these things are justified a posteriori. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §11 | |
A reaction: Not much of an argument, because 'quantum logic' may also turn out to be a will-o'-the-whisp. Until it is established (which I doubt, because quantum theory is so poorly understood), I think we should be highly suspicious of the Quinean view. |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75) |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
Full Idea: One dogma of empiricism is that there is some fundamental cleavage between truths that are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of facts, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.20) |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
Full Idea: The outer edge of our empirical system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its elaborate myths and fictions, has as its objective the simplicity of laws. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.45) |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258) |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
Full Idea: Quine's second dogma of empiricism is the reductionism that finds every statement to be linkable by fixed correspondence rules to a determinate range of confirming observations. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Stephen Yablo - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? V | |
A reaction: Quine's response to this is to embrace holism about theories, instead of precise connections with Humean impressions. I'm thinking that Lewis disagrees with Quine, when his Humean supervenience rests on a 'mosaic' of small qualities. |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59) |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101) |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109) |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96) |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103) |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80) |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203) |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234) |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
Full Idea: My suggestion, following Carnap, is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.41) |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204) |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
Full Idea: My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.42) | |
A reaction: I take the language and its subject matter to be obviously separate, but it is right that we can't separate these two components within a sample of language. |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: It is easy to see that intersubstitutability salva veritate is not a sufficient condition for synonymy. 'Renate' (with kidney) and 'cordate' (with heart) can be substituted in a purely extensional language, but are plainly not synonymous. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key example (along with Hesperus, and many others) in mapping out synonymy, meaning, analyticity, sense, reference, extension, intension, and all that stuff. |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
Full Idea: Once theory of meaning and of reference are separated it is a short step to recognising as the primary business of theory of meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and analyticity of statements; meanings themselves may be abandoned. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.22) | |
A reaction: I can't buy the abandonment of meaning, because when I introspect my own speech there is clearly what I want to say formulating in my mind before the words are settled. |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
Full Idea: Analytic statements fall into two classes: 'no unmarried man is married' typifies the first class, of logical truths; it remains true under all reinterpretations. 'No bachelor is married' is analytic if synonyms replace synonyms, and there's the problem. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], §1) | |
A reaction: Boghossian emphasises this passage. In other papers Quine argues that logical truths also cannot be purely analytic, although he does not deny that there are logical truths. |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
Full Idea: How do we find that 'bachelor' is defined as unmarried man? Who defined it thus, and when? Not the lexicographer, who is a scientist recording antecedent facts. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.24) | |
A reaction: All mid-20th C philosophy of language is too individualistic in its strategy. Eventually later Wittgenstein sank in, and socially agreed meanings for 'water' and 'elm'. |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Quine's attack on analyticity devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity - specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary truth, and the analytic theory of a priori knowledge. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §I | |
A reaction: Note that much more would be needed to complete Quine's aim of more or less eliminating both necessity and the a priori from his scientific philosophy. Quine was trying to complete a programme initiated by C.I. Lewis (q.v.). |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
Full Idea: Quine's attack argues against the Fregean attempt to define 'analyticity' in terms of synonymy - where analytical truths are logical truths ('unmarried men are unmarried'), or become logical truths by synonymous replacement ('bachelors are unmarried'). | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 02.1 | |
A reaction: This is a very helpful explanation of what is going on in Quine. Why won't philosophers explain clearly what they are attacking, before they attack it? |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
Full Idea: The arguments of the final two sections of 'Two Dogmas' have received more acceptance than the arguments of the first four sections, which are now generally acknowledged to be unsuccessful. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4 Read | |
A reaction: The early sections are the 'circular' argument against analyticity; the later parts are further discussions of the concept. We don't have to take Miller's word for this, but it is a useful pointer when reading the paper. |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
Full Idea: Erasing the line between the analytic and the synthetic saved philosophy of language as a serious subject by showing how it could be pursued without what there cannot be: determinate meanings. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Donald Davidson - Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge p.158 | |
A reaction: Note that this comes from the most famous modern champion of one of the main theories of meaning (as truth-conditions). Did anyone ever believe in reified objects called 'meanings'? |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Quine rejects the analytic on the grounds that it assumes a smaller unit of meaning than a total theory, and he does not think it makes sense to talk about such smaller units of meaning because there are no smaller units of empirical confirmation. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 7.5 | |
A reaction: A very helpful account of the famous Quine argument, showing how it arises out of his particular holistic view of empiricism. |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
Full Idea: In defining analyticity an appeal to meanings seems natural, but that reduces to synonymy or definition. Definition is a will-o'-the-wisp, and synonymy is best understood by a priori appeal to analyticity, so we are back at the problem of analyticity. | |
From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.32) | |
A reaction: Quine is full of these over-neat sceptical arguments, saying everything is circular, or can never get started. Compare Aristotle's benign circle of virtuous people and virtuous actions. |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68) | |
A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence. |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76) |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77) |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141) |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142) |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143) |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3) |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6) |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9) |