Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Sentences' and 'works'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
     A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
8249 Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
     Full Idea: Lesniewski distinguished the part-whole relationship from class membership. Membership is not transitive: if s is an element of t, and t of u, then s is not an element of u, whereas a part of a part is a part of the whole.
     From: report of Stanislaw Lesniewski (works [1916]) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic 7
     A reaction: If I am a member of a sports club, and my club is a member of the league, I am not thereby a member of the league (so clubs are classes, not wholes). This distinction is clearly fairly crucial in ontology.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
16697 Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Suppose God annihilates everything, and then creates something new. The vacant interval could last a shorter or longer time, so there are facts about time independent of facts about motion.
     From: report of William Crathorn (Sentences [1335], I.16, concl.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2
     A reaction: Not very persuasive if God is in some way 'timeless'. Crathorn would have loved Shoemaker's argument, where motionless time is the best explanation, rather than a possible explanation.