60 ideas
13466 | We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We are all post-Kantians, ...because Kant set an agenda for philosophy that we are still working through. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: Hart says that the main agenda is set by Kant's desire to defend the principle of sufficient reason against Hume's attack on causation. I would take it more generally to be the assessment of metaphysics, and of a priori knowledge. |
13477 | The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The real monuments of philosophy are its problems. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably he means '....rather than its solutions'. No other subject would be very happy with that sort of claim. Compare Idea 8243. A complaint against analytic philosophy is that it has achieved no consensus at all. |
13515 | To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: By now, no education in abstract pursuits is adequate without some familiarity with sets. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: A heart-sinking observation for those who aspire to study metaphysics and modality. The question is, what will count as 'some' familiarity? Are only professional logicians now allowed to be proper philosophers? |
13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Frege later became fastidious about definitions, and demanded that they must provide for every possible case, and that no function is properly determined unless its value is fixed for every conceivable object as argument. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 3.xiv | |
A reaction: Presumably definitions come in degrees of completeness, but it seems harsh to describe a desire for the perfect definition as 'fastidious', especially if we are talking about mathematics, rather than defining 'happiness'. |
9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
Full Idea: Given the reference (bedeutung) of an expression and a part of it, obviously the reference of the remaining part is not always determined. So we may not define a symbol or word by defining an expression in which it occurs, whose remaining parts are known | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §66) | |
A reaction: Dummett cites this as Frege's rejection of contextual definitions, which he had employed in the Grundlagen. I take it not so much that they are wrong, as that Frege decided to set the bar a bit higher. |
10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
Full Idea: Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple can only be pointed to. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §180), quoted by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.137 | |
A reaction: Frege presumably has in mind his treasured abstract objects, such as cardinal numbers. It is hard to see how you could 'point to' anything in the phenomenal world that had atomic simplicity. Hodes calls this a 'desperate Kantian move'. |
13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It is an ancient and honourable view that truth is correspondence to fact; Tarski showed us how to do without facts here. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a very interesting spin on Tarski, who certainly seems to endorse the correspondence theory, even while apparently inventing a new 'semantic' theory of truth. It is controversial how far Tarski's theory really is a 'correspondence' theory. |
13504 | Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We explain truth for sentences in terms of satisfaction of formulae. The crux here is that for a sentence, either all sequences satisfy it or none do (with no middle ground). For formulae, some sequences may satisfy it and others not. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: This is the hardest part of Tarski's theory of truth to grasp. |
13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In any first-order language, there are infinitely many T-sentences. Since definitions should be finite, the agglomeration of all the T-sentences is not a definition of truth. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: This may be a warning shot aimed at Davidson's extensive use of Tarski's formal account in his own views on meaning in natural language. |
13500 | Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A 'conditional proof' licenses inferences to a conditional from a deduction of its consequent from its antecedent. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: That is, a proof can be enshrined in an arrow. |
13502 | ∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: When a quantifier is attached to a variable, as in '∃(y)....', then it should be read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that....'. One should not read it as 'There exists a y such that...', which would attach predicate to quantifier. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: The point is to make clear that in classical logic the predicates attach to the objects, and not to some formal component like a quantifier. |
13456 | Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It is set theory, and more specifically the theory of relations, that articulates order. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010]) | |
A reaction: It would seem that we mainly need set theory in order to talk accurately about order, and about infinity. The two come together in the study of the ordinal numbers. |
13497 | Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The theory of types is a thing of the past. There is now nothing to choose between ZFC and NBG (Neumann-Bernays-Gödel). NF (Quine's) is a more specialized taste, but is a place to look if you want the universe. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13443 | ∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: ∈ relates across layers (Plato is a member of his unit set and the set of people), while ⊆ relates within layers (the singleton of Plato is a subset of the set of people). This distinction only became clear in the 19th century. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: Getting these two clear may be the most important distinction needed to understand how set theory works. |
13442 | Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Without the empty set, disjoint sets would have no intersection, and we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet. This is an example of the utility of the empty set. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: A novice might plausibly ask why there should be an intersection for every pair of sets, if they have nothing in common except for containing this little puff of nothingness. But then what do novices know? |
13493 | In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In the second half of the twentieth century there emerged the opinion that foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: It is foundation which is the central axiom of the iterative conception of sets, where each level of sets is built on previous levels, and they are all 'well-founded'. |
13495 | Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The usual statement of Foundation is that any nonempty set has a member disjoint from it. This phrasing is ordinal-free and closer to the primitives of ZFC. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13461 | We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: When a set is finite, we can prove it has a choice function (∀x x∈A → f(x)∈A), but we need an axiom when A is infinite and the members opaque. From infinite shoes we can pick a left one, but from socks we need the axiom of choice. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: The socks example in from Russell 1919:126. |
13462 | With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It follows from the Axiom of Choice that every set can be well-ordered. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: For 'well-ordered' see Idea 13460. Every set can be ordered with a least member. |
13516 | If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It has been said (by Burt Dreben) that the only reason set theorists do not generally buy the view that V = L is that it would put them out of business by settling their open questions. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: Hart says V=L breaks with the interative conception of sets at level ω+1, which is countable is the constructible view, but has continuum many in the cumulative (iterative) hierarch. The constructible V=L view is anti-platonist. |
13441 | Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: 'Comprehension' is the assumption that every predicate has an extension. Naïve set theory is the theory whose axioms are extensionality and comprehension, and comprehension is thought to be its naivety. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: This doesn't, of course, mean that there couldn't be a more modest version of comprehension. The notorious difficulty come with the discovery of self-referring predicates which can't possibly have extensions. |
13494 | The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: That the iterative sets suffice for most of ZFC does not show they are necessary, nor is it evident that the set of operations has no fixed points (as 0 is a fixed point for square-of), and no infinitely descending chains (like negative integers). | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: People don't seem to worry that they aren't 'necessary', and further measures are possible to block infinitely descending chains. |
13457 | A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We say that a binary relation R 'partially orders' a field A just in case R is irreflexive (so that nothing bears R to itself) and transitive. When the set is {a,b}, its subsets {a} and {b} are incomparable in a partial ordering. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13458 | A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A partial ordering is a 'total ordering' just in case any two members of its field are comparable, that is, either a is R to b, or b is R to a, or a is b. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13457 for 'partial ordering'. The three conditions are known as the 'trichotomy' condition. |
13490 | Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: One of the glories of Von Neumann's theory of numbers is to define α < β to mean that α ∈ β. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13460 | 'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A total order 'well-orders' its field just in case any nonempty subset B of its field has an R-least member, that is, there is a b in B such that for any a in B different from b, b bears R to a. So less-than well-orders natural numbers, but not integers. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: The natural numbers have a starting point, but the integers are infinite in both directions. In plain English, an order is 'well-ordered' if there is a starting point. |
13481 | Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Some have claimed that sets should be rethought in terms of still more basic things, categories. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites F.William Lawvere 1966] It appears to the the context of foundations for mathematics that he has in mind. |
13506 | The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: All the main set theories deny that there is a set of which everything is a member. No interpretation has a domain with everything in it. So the universal quantifier never gets to mean everything all at once; 'all' does not mean all. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: Could you have an 'uncompleted' universal set, in the spirit of uncompleted infinities? In ordinary English we can talk about 'absolutely everything' - we just can't define a set of everything. Must we 'define' our domain? |
13513 | Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 9) |
13505 | Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Modern model theory investigates which set theoretic structures are models for which collections of sentences. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: So first you must choose your set theory (see Idea 13497). Then you presumably look at how to formalise sentences, and then look at the really tricky ones, many of which will involve various degrees of infinity. |
13511 | Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: There is no developed methematics of models for second-order theories, so for the most part, model theory is about models for first-order theories. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 9) |
13512 | Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The beginning of modern model theory was when Morley proved Los's Conjecture in 1962 - that a complete theory in a countable language categorical in one uncountable cardinal is categorical in all. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 9) |
13496 | First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is 'compact', which means that any logical consequence of a set (finite or infinite) of first-order sentences is a logical consequence of a finite subset of those sentences. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13484 | Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Berry's Paradox: by the least number principle 'the least number denoted by no description of fewer than 79 letters' exists, but we just referred to it using a description of 77 letters. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: I struggle with this. If I refer to 'an object to which no human being could possibly refer', have I just referred to something? Graham Priest likes this sort of idea. |
13482 | The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The Burali-Forti Paradox was a crisis for Cantor's theory of ordinal numbers. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In effect, the machinery introduced to solve the liar can always be rejigged to yield another version the liar. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Hans Herzberger 1980-81] The machinery is Tarski's device of only talking about sentences of a language by using a 'metalanguage'. |
9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
Full Idea: The cardinals and the reals are completely disjoint domains. The cardinal numbers answer the question 'How many objects of a given kind are there?', but the real numbers are for measurement, saying how large a quantity is compared to a unit quantity. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §157), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.19 | |
A reaction: We might say that cardinals are digital and reals are analogue. Frege is unusual in totally separating them. They map onto one another, after all. Cardinals look like special cases of reals. Reals are dreams about the gaps between cardinals. |
13459 | The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We can show (using the axiom of choice) that the less-than relation, <, well-orders the ordinals, ...and that it partially orders the ordinals, ...and that it totally orders the ordinals. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13463 | There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Since we can map the transfinite ordinals one-one into the infinite cardinals, there are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13491 | The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The axiom of infinity with separation yields a least limit ordinal, which is called ω. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13492 | Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It is easier to generalize von Neumann's finite ordinals into the transfinite. All Zermelo's nonzero finite ordinals are singletons, but if ω were a singleton it is hard to see how if could fail to be the successor of its member and so not a limit. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege fixed on construing real numbers as ratios of quantities (in agreement with Newton). | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.20 | |
A reaction: If 3/4 is the same real number as 6/8, which is the correct ratio? Why doesn't the square root of 9/16 also express it? Why should irrationals be so utterly different from rationals? In what sense are they both 'numbers'? |
13446 | 19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The real numbers were not isolated from geometry until the arithmetization of analysis during the nineteenth century. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13509 | We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Mathematical induction is a way to establish truths about the infinity of natural numbers by a finite proof. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 5) | |
A reaction: If there are truths about infinities, it is very tempting to infer that the infinities must therefore 'exist'. A nice, and large, question in philosophy is whether there can be truths without corresponding implications of existence. |
13474 | Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: There is a familiar comparison between Euclid (unique parallel) and 'spherical' geometry (no parallel) and 'saddle' geometry (several parallels). | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) |
10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: For Frege, in 'Grundgesetze', a number is a class of classes of the same cardinality. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 |
10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
Full Idea: The inconsistency of Grundgesetze was only a minor flaw. Its fundamental flaw was its inability to account for the way in which the senses of number terms are determined. It leaves the reference-magnetic nature of the standard numberer a mystery. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903]) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.139 | |
A reaction: A point also made by Hofweber. As a logician, Frege was only concerned with the inferential role of number terms, and he felt he had captured their logical form, but it is when you come to look at numbers in natural language that he seem in trouble. |
13471 | Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The thesis that no existence proposition is analytic is one of the few constants in philosophical consciences, but there are many existence claims in mathematics, such as the infinity of primes, five regular solids, and certain undecidable propositions. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) |
9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege's three main objections to radical formalism are that it cannot account for the application of mathematics, that it confuses a formal theory with its metatheory, and it cannot explain an infinite sequence. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §86-137) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics | |
A reaction: The application is because we don't design maths randomly, but to be useful. The third objection might be dealt with by potential infinities (from formal rules). The second objection sounds promising. |
8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
Full Idea: It is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §91), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 6.1.2 | |
A reaction: This is the basic objection to Formalism. It invites the question of why it is applicable, which platonists like Frege don't seem to answer (though Plato himself has reality modelled on the Forms). This is why I like structuralism. |
13488 | Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Jespersen calls a noun a mass word when it has no plural, does not take numerical adjectives, and does not take 'fewer'. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: Jespersen was a great linguistics expert. |
9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
Full Idea: The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §160), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.22 | |
A reaction: Nothing I have read about vagueness has made me doubt Frege's view of this, although precisification might allow you to do logic with vague concepts without having to finally settle where the actual boundaries are. |
13480 | Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The conception of Frege is that self-evidence is an intrinsic property of the basic truths, rules, and thoughts expressed by definitions. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], p.350) | |
A reaction: The problem is always that what appears to be self-evident may turn out to be wrong. Presumably the effort of arriving at a definition ought to clarify and support the self-evident ingredient. |
13476 | The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In the case of the parallels postulate, Euclid's fifth axiom (the whole is greater than the part), and comprehension, saying was believing for a while, but what was said was false. This should make a shrewd philosopher sceptical about a priori knowledge. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: Euclid's fifth is challenged by infinite numbers, and comprehension is challenged by Russell's paradox. I can't see a defender of the a priori being greatly worried about these cases. No one ever said we would be right - in doing arithmetic, for example. |
13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A Fregean concept is a function that assigns to each object a truth value. So instead of the colour green, the concept GREEN assigns truth to each green thing, but falsity to anything else. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: This would seem to immediately hit the renate/cordate problem, if there was a world in which all and only the green things happened to be square. How could Frege then distinguish the green from the square? Compare Idea 8245. |
9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
Full Idea: From geometry we retain the interpretation of a real number as a ratio of quantities or measurement-number; but in more recent times we detach it from geometrical quantities, and from all particular types of quantity. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §159), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics | |
A reaction: Dummett glosses the 'recent' version as by Cantor and Dedekind in 1872. This use of 'detach' seems to me startlingly like the sort of psychological abstractionism which Frege was so desperate to avoid. |
11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
Full Idea: If abstracting from the difference between my house and my neighbour's, I were to regard both houses as mine, the defect of the abstraction would soon be made clear. It may, though, be possible to obtain a concept by means of abstraction... | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §99) | |
A reaction: Note the important concession at the end, which shows Frege could never deny the abstraction process, despite all the modern protests by Geach and Dummett that he totally rejected it. |
21785 | We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
Full Idea: Hegel says we are only truly free, and so bearers of rights, in so far as we claim our freedom. ...So there are no merely natural rights, and animal's have no rights. | |
From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.78) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
A reaction: If there are no natural rights, then it is hard to see how claiming a right will create it. I can't create a right to drink the best champagne. It seems particularly unjust to deny rights to people so enslaved that freedom has never occurred to them. |
22041 | Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Selecting representatives on the basis of geography means selecting people without any regard to whether they represent the basic and important interests of the 'whole' of society. | |
From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11 | |
A reaction: Proportional representation seems to get away from this, but that can still be arranged according to large regions. Some means is needed to prevent the whole nation from exploitation a regional minority (such as Welsh speakers). |
21781 | The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The absolute right is the right to have rights. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.127), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
A reaction: What a beautifully succinct and important idea! Does a foetus, or a dog, or a person in a vegetative state, or a slave, qualify? |