72 ideas
13466 | We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We are all post-Kantians, ...because Kant set an agenda for philosophy that we are still working through. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: Hart says that the main agenda is set by Kant's desire to defend the principle of sufficient reason against Hume's attack on causation. I would take it more generally to be the assessment of metaphysics, and of a priori knowledge. |
13477 | The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The real monuments of philosophy are its problems. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably he means '....rather than its solutions'. No other subject would be very happy with that sort of claim. Compare Idea 8243. A complaint against analytic philosophy is that it has achieved no consensus at all. |
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
13515 | To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: By now, no education in abstract pursuits is adequate without some familiarity with sets. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: A heart-sinking observation for those who aspire to study metaphysics and modality. The question is, what will count as 'some' familiarity? Are only professional logicians now allowed to be proper philosophers? |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It is an ancient and honourable view that truth is correspondence to fact; Tarski showed us how to do without facts here. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a very interesting spin on Tarski, who certainly seems to endorse the correspondence theory, even while apparently inventing a new 'semantic' theory of truth. It is controversial how far Tarski's theory really is a 'correspondence' theory. |
13504 | Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We explain truth for sentences in terms of satisfaction of formulae. The crux here is that for a sentence, either all sequences satisfy it or none do (with no middle ground). For formulae, some sequences may satisfy it and others not. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: This is the hardest part of Tarski's theory of truth to grasp. |
13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In any first-order language, there are infinitely many T-sentences. Since definitions should be finite, the agglomeration of all the T-sentences is not a definition of truth. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: This may be a warning shot aimed at Davidson's extensive use of Tarski's formal account in his own views on meaning in natural language. |
13500 | Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A 'conditional proof' licenses inferences to a conditional from a deduction of its consequent from its antecedent. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: That is, a proof can be enshrined in an arrow. |
13502 | ∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: When a quantifier is attached to a variable, as in '∃(y)....', then it should be read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that....'. One should not read it as 'There exists a y such that...', which would attach predicate to quantifier. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: The point is to make clear that in classical logic the predicates attach to the objects, and not to some formal component like a quantifier. |
13456 | Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It is set theory, and more specifically the theory of relations, that articulates order. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010]) | |
A reaction: It would seem that we mainly need set theory in order to talk accurately about order, and about infinity. The two come together in the study of the ordinal numbers. |
13497 | Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The theory of types is a thing of the past. There is now nothing to choose between ZFC and NBG (Neumann-Bernays-Gödel). NF (Quine's) is a more specialized taste, but is a place to look if you want the universe. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13443 | ∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: ∈ relates across layers (Plato is a member of his unit set and the set of people), while ⊆ relates within layers (the singleton of Plato is a subset of the set of people). This distinction only became clear in the 19th century. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: Getting these two clear may be the most important distinction needed to understand how set theory works. |
13442 | Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Without the empty set, disjoint sets would have no intersection, and we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet. This is an example of the utility of the empty set. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: A novice might plausibly ask why there should be an intersection for every pair of sets, if they have nothing in common except for containing this little puff of nothingness. But then what do novices know? |
13493 | In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In the second half of the twentieth century there emerged the opinion that foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: It is foundation which is the central axiom of the iterative conception of sets, where each level of sets is built on previous levels, and they are all 'well-founded'. |
13495 | Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The usual statement of Foundation is that any nonempty set has a member disjoint from it. This phrasing is ordinal-free and closer to the primitives of ZFC. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13461 | We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: When a set is finite, we can prove it has a choice function (∀x x∈A → f(x)∈A), but we need an axiom when A is infinite and the members opaque. From infinite shoes we can pick a left one, but from socks we need the axiom of choice. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: The socks example in from Russell 1919:126. |
13462 | With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It follows from the Axiom of Choice that every set can be well-ordered. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: For 'well-ordered' see Idea 13460. Every set can be ordered with a least member. |
13516 | If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It has been said (by Burt Dreben) that the only reason set theorists do not generally buy the view that V = L is that it would put them out of business by settling their open questions. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: Hart says V=L breaks with the interative conception of sets at level ω+1, which is countable is the constructible view, but has continuum many in the cumulative (iterative) hierarch. The constructible V=L view is anti-platonist. |
13441 | Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: 'Comprehension' is the assumption that every predicate has an extension. Naïve set theory is the theory whose axioms are extensionality and comprehension, and comprehension is thought to be its naivety. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: This doesn't, of course, mean that there couldn't be a more modest version of comprehension. The notorious difficulty come with the discovery of self-referring predicates which can't possibly have extensions. |
13494 | The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: That the iterative sets suffice for most of ZFC does not show they are necessary, nor is it evident that the set of operations has no fixed points (as 0 is a fixed point for square-of), and no infinitely descending chains (like negative integers). | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: People don't seem to worry that they aren't 'necessary', and further measures are possible to block infinitely descending chains. |
13457 | A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We say that a binary relation R 'partially orders' a field A just in case R is irreflexive (so that nothing bears R to itself) and transitive. When the set is {a,b}, its subsets {a} and {b} are incomparable in a partial ordering. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13458 | A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A partial ordering is a 'total ordering' just in case any two members of its field are comparable, that is, either a is R to b, or b is R to a, or a is b. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13457 for 'partial ordering'. The three conditions are known as the 'trichotomy' condition. |
13460 | 'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A total order 'well-orders' its field just in case any nonempty subset B of its field has an R-least member, that is, there is a b in B such that for any a in B different from b, b bears R to a. So less-than well-orders natural numbers, but not integers. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: The natural numbers have a starting point, but the integers are infinite in both directions. In plain English, an order is 'well-ordered' if there is a starting point. |
13490 | Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: One of the glories of Von Neumann's theory of numbers is to define α < β to mean that α ∈ β. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13481 | Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Some have claimed that sets should be rethought in terms of still more basic things, categories. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites F.William Lawvere 1966] It appears to the the context of foundations for mathematics that he has in mind. |
13506 | The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: All the main set theories deny that there is a set of which everything is a member. No interpretation has a domain with everything in it. So the universal quantifier never gets to mean everything all at once; 'all' does not mean all. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: Could you have an 'uncompleted' universal set, in the spirit of uncompleted infinities? In ordinary English we can talk about 'absolutely everything' - we just can't define a set of everything. Must we 'define' our domain? |
13512 | Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The beginning of modern model theory was when Morley proved Los's Conjecture in 1962 - that a complete theory in a countable language categorical in one uncountable cardinal is categorical in all. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 9) |
13505 | Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Modern model theory investigates which set theoretic structures are models for which collections of sentences. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: So first you must choose your set theory (see Idea 13497). Then you presumably look at how to formalise sentences, and then look at the really tricky ones, many of which will involve various degrees of infinity. |
13511 | Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: There is no developed methematics of models for second-order theories, so for the most part, model theory is about models for first-order theories. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 9) |
13513 | Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 9) |
13496 | First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is 'compact', which means that any logical consequence of a set (finite or infinite) of first-order sentences is a logical consequence of a finite subset of those sentences. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13484 | Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Berry's Paradox: by the least number principle 'the least number denoted by no description of fewer than 79 letters' exists, but we just referred to it using a description of 77 letters. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: I struggle with this. If I refer to 'an object to which no human being could possibly refer', have I just referred to something? Graham Priest likes this sort of idea. |
13482 | The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The Burali-Forti Paradox was a crisis for Cantor's theory of ordinal numbers. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In effect, the machinery introduced to solve the liar can always be rejigged to yield another version the liar. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Hans Herzberger 1980-81] The machinery is Tarski's device of only talking about sentences of a language by using a 'metalanguage'. |
13459 | The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: We can show (using the axiom of choice) that the less-than relation, <, well-orders the ordinals, ...and that it partially orders the ordinals, ...and that it totally orders the ordinals. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13491 | The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The axiom of infinity with separation yields a least limit ordinal, which is called ω. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13463 | There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Since we can map the transfinite ordinals one-one into the infinite cardinals, there are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13492 | Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It is easier to generalize von Neumann's finite ordinals into the transfinite. All Zermelo's nonzero finite ordinals are singletons, but if ω were a singleton it is hard to see how if could fail to be the successor of its member and so not a limit. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) |
13446 | 19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The real numbers were not isolated from geometry until the arithmetization of analysis during the nineteenth century. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 1) |
13509 | We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Mathematical induction is a way to establish truths about the infinity of natural numbers by a finite proof. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 5) | |
A reaction: If there are truths about infinities, it is very tempting to infer that the infinities must therefore 'exist'. A nice, and large, question in philosophy is whether there can be truths without corresponding implications of existence. |
13474 | Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: There is a familiar comparison between Euclid (unique parallel) and 'spherical' geometry (no parallel) and 'saddle' geometry (several parallels). | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) |
13471 | Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The thesis that no existence proposition is analytic is one of the few constants in philosophical consciences, but there are many existence claims in mathematics, such as the infinity of primes, five regular solids, and certain undecidable propositions. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) |
13488 | Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Jespersen calls a noun a mass word when it has no plural, does not take numerical adjectives, and does not take 'fewer'. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: Jespersen was a great linguistics expert. |
13480 | Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: The conception of Frege is that self-evidence is an intrinsic property of the basic truths, rules, and thoughts expressed by definitions. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], p.350) | |
A reaction: The problem is always that what appears to be self-evident may turn out to be wrong. Presumably the effort of arriving at a definition ought to clarify and support the self-evident ingredient. |
13476 | The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In the case of the parallels postulate, Euclid's fifth axiom (the whole is greater than the part), and comprehension, saying was believing for a while, but what was said was false. This should make a shrewd philosopher sceptical about a priori knowledge. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: Euclid's fifth is challenged by infinite numbers, and comprehension is challenged by Russell's paradox. I can't see a defender of the a priori being greatly worried about these cases. No one ever said we would be right - in doing arithmetic, for example. |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: A Fregean concept is a function that assigns to each object a truth value. So instead of the colour green, the concept GREEN assigns truth to each green thing, but falsity to anything else. | |
From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: This would seem to immediately hit the renate/cordate problem, if there was a world in which all and only the green things happened to be square. How could Frege then distinguish the green from the square? Compare Idea 8245. |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume] |
Full Idea: Though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy or astronomy, be deemed unfair, yet in all questions with regard to morals there is really no other standard for deciding controversies. | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.291) | |
A reaction: Surely this is too pessimistic. Common opinion decided to burn people to death for being witches. Common opinion may usually win, but there must sometimes be good grounds for resisting it. |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
21099 | People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education [Hume] |
Full Idea: When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education, ...then nothing but their own consent could at first associate them together, and subject them to authority. | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.276) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound very convincing. Some people are much better suited than others to training and education. Men vary enormously in size. |
21100 | The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience [Hume] |
Full Idea: Were you to preach in most parts of the world that political connections are founded altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you as seditious for loosening the ties of obedience. | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.278) | |
A reaction: He cites obedience as the prime civic virtue, because the law can't operate without it. He doesn't seem to consider the limiting cases of obedience, which makes him essentially a conservative. |
20495 | We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep [Hume] |
Full Idea: [If we give 'tacit' assent to the state] ...we may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried aboard while asleep. | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.283) | |
A reaction: We should probably drop the whole idea that we give assent to the state. We are stuck with a state, and a few of us can escape, if it seems important enough, but most of us have no choice. He hope to assent to the controllers of the state. |
21101 | The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent [Hume] |
Full Idea: When we assert that all lawful government arises from the consent of the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honour than they deserve, or even expect or desire from us. | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.285) | |
A reaction: Hume has no interest in the purely abstract idea of a contract, and scorns Locke's idea of tacit consent to government. I assume he would dismiss Rawls as unrealistic theorising. Hume loves peace, and is alarmed by change. |
6703 | Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state [Hume] |
Full Idea: Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages that he acquires? | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.283) | |
A reaction: Of course, in the nineteenth century the Scottish poor did, going to America, which welcomed the poor, and spoke English. Hume's point is the right reply to anyone who says 'If you don't like it, go elsewhere'. Also 'No! Change it!' |
21102 | We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices [Hume] |
Full Idea: Reason tells us that there is no property in durable objects, such as land or houses, when carefully examined in passing from hand to hand, but must, in some period, have been founded on fraud and injustice. | |
From: David Hume (Of the original contract [1741], p.288) | |
A reaction: A prime objection to Nozick, who fantasises about an initial position of just ownership, which can then be the subject of just contracts. In 1866 thousands of white people were granted land in the USA, but not a single black freed slave got anything. |