Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Consciousness Exist?', 'Could There Be Unicorns?' and 'De rebus naturalibus'

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13 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16951 It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The new discovery was that with a suitable structure imposed on the space of possible worlds, the Leibnizian idea would work for all modal logics.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16952 If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, and S is possible but doesn't obtain, then T is only possible in the world where S obtains, but T is not possible in the actual world. It follows that the relation of relative possibility is not transitive.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed]
16953 Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, T and S hold in the actual world, and S does not obtain in world v possible relative to the actual world, then the actual is not possible relative to v, since T holds in the actual. Accessibility can't be symmetrical.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
16960 If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If some world is 'a way the world might be considered to be if things were different in a certain respect', that might show that the accessibility relation should not be taken to be transitive, and we should have to adopt modal logic T.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: He has already rejected symmetry from the relation, for reasons concerning relative identity. He is torn between T and S4, but rejects S5, and opts not to discuss it.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
16958 In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
     Full Idea: In S4 logic the actual world is, in itself, special, not just from our point of view.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: S4 lacks symmetricality, so 'you can get there, but you can't get back', which makes the starting point special. So if you think the actual world has a special place in modal metaphysics, you must reject S5?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
16740 A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
     A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16957 Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The equation of a possible world with the way that the (actual) world might be is wrong: the way a distant world might be is not a way the world might be, but a way we might allow it to be given how some intervening world might be.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: The point here is that a system of possible worlds must include relative possibilities as well as actual possibilities. Dummett argues against S5 modal logic, which makes them all equal. Things impossible here might become possible. Nice.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16959 If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If our space of possible worlds has no structure, as in the semantics for S5, then, from the standpoint of the semantics, all possible worlds are on the same footing; it then becomes difficult to resist the claim that all are equally real.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: This is a rather startling and interesting claim, given that modern philosophy seems full of thinkers who both espouse S5 for metaphysics, and also deny Lewisian realism about possible worlds. I'll ponder that one. Must read the new Williamson….
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9286 Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
     Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
     A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
9285 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
     Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
     A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
16956 To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
     Full Idea: It cannot be explained what it is for a person to be generous without first explaining what it is for an action to be generous.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 4)
     A reaction: I presume a slot machine can't be 'generous', even if it favours the punter, so you can't specify a generous action without making reference to the person. A benign circle, as Aristotle says.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
16571 Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
     A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
16954 Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
     Full Idea: In my view, Kripke's promotion of 'natural kinds', coverning chemical substances and animal and plant species, is unfortunate, since these are rather different types of things, and words used for them behave differently.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 2)
     A reaction: My view is that the only significant difference among natural kinds is their degree of stability in character. Presumably particles, elements and particular molecules are fairly invariant, but living things evolve.