Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth', 'Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics'' and 'Aristotelian commentaries'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

22642	Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
	Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh')
	A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths

22641	Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
	Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
	A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

16751	Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: The Coimbrans have five degrees of unity: by aggregation (stones), by order (an army), per accidens (inherence), per se composite unity (connected), and per se unity of simple things.
	From: report of Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], Phys I.9.11.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3
	A reaction: [my summary of Pasnau's summary] Take some stones, then order them, then glue them together, then melt them together. The unity of inherence is a different type of unity from these stages. This is a hylomorphic view.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16720	Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
	Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities.
	From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'?

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

22109	The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
	Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality.
	From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
	A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

22640	We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
	Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
	A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it.