68 ideas
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
Full Idea: Fine distinguishes 'implicit definitions', where we must know it is satisfiable before it is deployed, 'creative definitions', where objects are introduced in virtue of the definition, ..and 'contextual definitions', based on established vocabulary. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], 060) by R Cook / P Ebert - Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' 3 | |
A reaction: Fine is a fan of creative definition. This sounds something like the distinction between cutting nature at the perceived joints, and speculating about where new joints might be inserted. Quite a helpful thought. |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: What I call 'creative definitions' are made from a standpoint in which the existence of the objects that are to be assigned to the terms is not presupposed. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], II.1) |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Eventually set theory will have to be either naturalised or rejected, if a thoroughgoing physicalism is to be maintained. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I regard Platonism as a form of naturalism (though a rather bold and dramatic one). The central issue seems to be the ability of the human main/brain to form 'abstract' notions about the physical world in which it lives. |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for a proponent of both sets and abstracts to identify the abstracts, in any reasonable manner, with the sets. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], IV.1) | |
A reaction: [This observation emerges from a proof Fine has just completed] Cf Idea 10137. The implication is that there is no compromise view available, and one must choose between abstraction or sets as one's account of numbers and groups of concepts. |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Points in abstract Euclidean space are abstract objects, and yet are not objects of abstraction, since they are not introduced through a principle of abstraction of the sort envisaged by Frege. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.1) | |
A reaction: The point seems to be that they are not abstracted 'from' anything, but are simpy posited as basic constituents. I suggest that points are idealisations (of smallness) rather than abstractions. They are idealised 'from' substances. |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A procedural form of postulationism says that instead of stipulating that certain statements are true, one specifies certain procedures for extending the domain to one in which the statement will in fact be true, without invoking an abstract ontology. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], II.5) | |
A reaction: The whole of philosophy might go better if it was founded on procedures and processes, rather than on objects. The Hopi Indians were right. |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
Full Idea: If types cannot be reduced to more physical levels, this is not an embarrassment, as long as our institutional categories, our physiological categories, and our physical categories are just alternative groupings of the same tokens. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is a self-evident truth about a car engine, so I don't see why it wouldn't apply equally to a brain. Lycan's identification of the type as the thing which cannot be reduced seems a promising explanation of much confusion among philosophers. |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Institutional types are irreducible, though I assume that institutional tokens are reducible in the sense of strict identity, all the way down to the subatomic level. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This seems a promising distinction, as the boundaries of 'institutions' disappear when you begin to reduce them to lower levels (cf. Idea 4601), and yet plenty of institutions are self-evidently no more than physics. Plants are invisible as physics. |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
Full Idea: One space-time slice may be occupied by a collection of molecules, a metal strip, a key, an allower of entry to hotel rooms, a facilitator of adultery, and a destroyer souls. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Desdemona's handkerchief is a nice example. This sort of remark seems to be felt by some philosophers to be heartless wickedness, and yet it so screamingly self-evident that it is impossible to deny. |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.0) | |
A reaction: A passing remark in a discussion of functionalism about the mind, but I find it appealing. Causation is basic to materialistic metaphysics, and it creates networks of regular causes. It leaves open the essentialist question of WHY it has that role. |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
Full Idea: With the concept of belief (e.g. in animals) comes recognition, expectation and surprise. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |
A reaction: A good observation. It is always tempting to see mental faculties in isolation, but each one drags along other capacities with it. Looks a bit holistic. |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
Full Idea: To say that an animal has beliefs is to imply not just that it can make mistakes, but also that it can learn from them. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |
A reaction: A bold claim which is hard to substantiate. Seems right, though. Why would they change a belief? It can't be a belief if it isn't changeable. That would be an instinct. |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Personally I favour direct realism regarding secondary qualities, and identify greenness with some complex microphysical property exemplified by green physical objects. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4) | |
A reaction: He cites D.M.Armstrong (1981) as his source. Personally I find this a bewildering proposal. Does he think there is greenness in grass AS WELL AS the emission of that wavelength of electro-magnetic radiation? Is greenness zooming through the air? |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Perception is a higher state than sensation: it involves not just a response to the outer world, but also an assessment of it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.14) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a simple but really important distinction, even though it wickedly uses the word 'higher', which Greeks like but post-Humeans struggle with. But we all know it is higher, don't we? |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
Full Idea: There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.23) | |
A reaction: Not a point that would trouble an eliminativist, as it sounds suspiciously circular or question-begging. |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Intentionality comes in degrees. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: I agree. A footprint is 'about' a foot, in the sense of containing concentrated information about it. Can we, though, envisage a higher degree than human thought? Is there a maximum degree? Everything is 'about' everything, in some respect. |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The teleological view begins to explain intentionality, and in particular allows brain states and events to have false intentional content; causal and nomological theories of intentionality tend to falter on this last task. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Certainly if you say thought is 'caused' by the world, false thought become puzzling. I'm not sure I understand the rest of this, but it is an intriguing remark about a significant issue… |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Our phenomenal experience of pain has components - it is a complex, consisting (perhaps) of urges, desires, impulses, and beliefs, probably occurring at quite different levels of institutional abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be true, and offers the reductionist a strategy for making inroads into the supposed irreducable and fundamental nature of qualia. What's it like to be a complex hierarchically structured multi-functional organism? |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
Full Idea: It is just arbitrary to choose a level of nature a priori as the locus of qualia, even though we can agree that high levels (such as behaviourism) and low-levels (such as the subatomic) can be ruled out as totally improbable. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Very good. People scream 'qualia!' whenever the behaviour level or the atomic level are proposed as the locations of the mind, but the suggestion that they are complex, and are spread across many functional levels in the middle sounds good. |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.28) | |
A reaction: Interesting. I don't believe Roman legislators invented it, so where did it originate? Interesting that it is legalistic - a thing to which rights can accrue. Compare character, to which virtues accrue. |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
Full Idea: By interacting causally, Cartesian dualism seems to violate the conservation laws of physics (concerning matter and energy). This seems testable, and afferent and efferent pathways disappearing into thin air would suggest energy is not conserved. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 1.1) | |
A reaction: It would seem to be no problem as long as outputs were identical in energy to inputs. If the experiment could actually be done, the result might astonish us. |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Evolution has proceeded in all other known species by increasingly complex configurations of molecules and organs, which support primitive psychologies; our human psychologies are more advanced, but undeniably continuous with lower animals. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I find the evolution objection to dualism highly persuasive. I don't see how anyone can take evolution seriously and be a dualist. If there is a dramatic ontological break at some point, a plausible reason would be needed for that. |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Old joke: two Behaviourists meet in the street, and the first says,"You're fine; how am I?" | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], n1.6) | |
A reaction: This invites the response that introspection is uniquely authoritative about 'how we are', but this has been challenged quite a lot recently, which pushes us to consider whether these stupid behaviourists might actually have a good point. |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Conditioning involves a change of behaviour, but not necessarily a change of mind. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |
A reaction: I am inclined to doubt this. If I was conditioned in some way, I would expect my conscious state to change as well as my behaviour. |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
Full Idea: 'Analytical functionalists', who hold that meanings of mental terms are determined by the causal roles associated with them by 'folk psychology', deny themselves appeals to lower levels of functional organisation. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably folk psychology can fit into the kind of empirical methodology favoured by behaviourists, whereas 'lower levels' are going to become rather speculative and unscientific. |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The functionalist must find a level of characterisation of mental states that is not so abstract or behaviouristic as to rule out the possibility of inverted spectrum etc., nor so specific and structural as to fall into chauvinism. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: If too specific then animals and aliens won't be able to implement the necessary functions; if the theory becomes very behaviouristic, then it loses interest in the possibility of an inverted spectrum. He is certainly right to hunt for a middle ground. |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Even the software/hardware distinction as it is literally applied within computer science is philosophically unclear. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is true, and very important for functionalist theories of the mind. Even very volatile software is realised in 'hard' physics, and rewritable discs etc blur the distinction between 'programmable' and 'hardwired'. |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Highly teleological characterisations, unlike naïve and explicated mental characterisations, have the virtue of shading off fairly smoothly into (more) brutely physical ones. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Thus the purpose of a car engine, and a spark plug, and the spark, and the temperature, and the vibration of molecules show a fading away of the overt purpose, disappearing into the pointless activity of electrons and quantum levels. |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I am taking mental types to form a small subclass of teleological types occurring for the most part at a high level of functional abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: He goes on to say that he understand teleology in evolutionary terms. There is always a gap between how you characterise or individuate something, and what it actually is. To say spanners are 'a small subclass of tools' is not enough. |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
Full Idea: 'Neuron' may be understood as a physiological term or a functional term, so even the Identity Theorist is a Functionalist - one who locates mental entities at a very low level of abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This is a striking observation, and somewhat inclines me to switch from identity theory to functionalism. If you ask what is the correct level of abstraction, Lycan's teleological-homuncular version refers you to all the levels. |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Teleological functionalism helps us to understand the nature of biological and psychological laws, particularly in the face of Davidsonian scepticism about the latter. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I doubt the existence of psycho-physical laws, but only because of the vast complexity. They would be like the laws of weather. 'Psycho-physical' laws seem to presuppose some sort of dualism. |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I am explicating the mental in a reductive way, by reducing mental characterizations to homuncular institutional ones, which are teleological characterizations at various levels of functional abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I think this is the germ of a very good physicalist account of the mind. More is needed than a mere assertion about what the mind reduces to at the very lowest level; this offers a decent account of the descending stages of reduction. |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Quite possibly a Martian's humanoid behaviour is prompted by his having sensations somewhat unlike ours, despite his superficial behavioural similarities to us. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: I think this firmly refutes the multiple realisability objection to type-type physicalism. Mental events are individuated by their phenomenal features (known only to the user), and by their causal role (publicly available). These are separate. |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17) | |
A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling? |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19) | |
A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify. |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
Full Idea: Fine says creative definitions can found mathematics. His 'procedural postulationism' says one stipulates not truths, but certain procedures for extending a domain. The procedures can be stated without invoking an abstract ontology. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], 100) by R Cook / P Ebert - Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' 4 | |
A reaction: (For creative definitions, see Idea 9143) This sounds close in spirit to fictionalism, but with the emphasis on the procedure (which can presumably be formalized) rather than a pure act of imaginative creation. |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Many different kinds of mathematical objects (natural numbers, the reals, points, lines, figures, groups) can be regarded as forms of abstraction, with special theories having their basis in a general theory of abstraction. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.4) | |
A reaction: This result, if persuasive, would be just the sort of unified account which the whole problem of abstact ideas requires. |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A principle of abstraction is 'conceptual' when the items upon which it abstracts are concepts (e.g. a one-one correspondence associated with a number), and 'objectual' if they are objects (parallel lines associated with a direction). | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I) |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
Full Idea: Fine considers abstraction principles as instances of reconceptualization (rather than implicit definition, or using the Context Principle). This centres not on reference, but on new senses emerging from analysis of a given sense. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], 035) by R Cook / P Ebert - Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' 2 | |
A reaction: Fine develops an argument against this view, because (roughly) the procedure does not end in a unique result. Intuitively, the idea that abstraction is 'reconceptualization' sounds quite promising to me. |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The uncompromising abstractionist rejects set theory, seeing the theory of abstractions as an alternative, rather than as a supplement, to the standard theory of sets. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.1) | |
A reaction: There is also a 'compromising' version. Presumably you still have equivalence classes to categorise the objects, which are defined by their origin rather than by what they are members of... Cf. Idea 10145. |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We can see an object as being the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts. For example, we may say that 0 is the abstract of the empty concept with respect to the relation of one-one correspondence. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.2) | |
A reaction: This is Fine's attempt to give a modified account of the Fregean approach to abstraction. He says that the reference to a relation will solve the problem of identity between abstractions. |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The three forms of moral life (respect for persons, the pursuit of virtue and natural sympathy) all depend, in the last analysis, on piety, which is the deep-down recognition of our frailty and dependence. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.56) | |
A reaction: MacIntyre agrees. 'Piety' is an odd word, which attempts to link the point to religious teachings. 'Dependence' seems an adequate term. But can fully independent creatures dispense with morality? I think not. |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
Full Idea: We can see the Kantian 'Moral Law' as consisting precisely in those rules which rational beings would accept, when attempting to live by agreement. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.30) | |
A reaction: If this combines Kantian notions of duty with the obligations of contracts, it is the core of a very powerful moral theory. See the work of Tim Scanlon. Classic problems are still the weak, animals and free riders. |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33) | |
A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)? |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61) | |
A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality. |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54) | |
A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse). |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
Full Idea: That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.86) | |
A reaction: The problem cases all arise in wartime. Ideally we want to show sympathy even when being necessarily ruthless, but in practice we send the callous ones to do the horrible deed. |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59) | |
A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary. |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Utilitarian thinking does not replace or compete with the moral law, but guides us when the moral law is silent and only sympathy speaks. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.63) | |
A reaction: If the moral law is silent, it is not quite clear why we should follow sympathy rather than contempt. There is the well-known danger here of the moral law turning out to lack content. |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It was precisely the inability of utilitarianism to explain the distinction between animals and people which led to its rejection. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.50) | |
A reaction: A nice turning of the tables, rejecting the utilitarian pride in incorporating animals into their theory where others (like Kant) reject them. Yet in one respect (suffering) they are inescapably very like us. |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Stalin and Hitler justified their actions in utilitarian terms, ..and no one can accuse them, for who knows what the long-term effects of their actions might be? But a morality which can't pass final judgement on Hitler or Stalin is a kind of sick joke. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
A reaction: A powerful argument against simplistic consequentialism. We can judge an action at any time, even beforehand, and that must be part of morality, which can't just observe the unfolding consequences. |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is nearer the truth to see morality as setting the limits to practical reasoning, rather than being a species of it. Moral principles tell us precisely that we must go no further along the path of calculation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
A reaction: Well said. If you are assessing whether an act of vicious brutality is required, you have probably already gone morally astray. It is not hard, though, to think of counterexamples, especially in wartime. |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Dog-fights and bear-baiting are naturally forbidden by law, because they threaten the personality of those who attend them. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.107) | |
A reaction: Hm. If this is so, it is mainly because it takes place in a closed pen, where we can get a close look at the brutality and blood. It could be said to be more honest than hunting with gun or hounds. 'Go on eyes, look your worst'. |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Most of the stranger forms of life (worms, fleas, locusts etc.) are not really suitors for our moral concern, and interest us primarily as species, and only rarely as individuals. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.13) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but that seems to reflect on us, rather than cutting nature at the joints. As soon as you look closely, you recognise an individual rather than a member of a species. |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of intentionality introduces the first genuine claim of animals upon our sympathies and our moral concern. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |
A reaction: Good. If one's approach to morality is Humean (via sympathy) this seems right. Utilitarianism bases animal rights on qualia (pleasures and pains). |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
Full Idea: An animal has acquired individuality if the gift of a proper name seems appropriate, the high point being reached with animals such as dogs which actually respond to their own name. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.39) | |
A reaction: Interesting, even though it is rather chauvinistic. I might name the fleas in my circus, but regard a whole section of the human race as indistinguishable and not worth naming. |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.75) | |
A reaction: He is talking about race horses and St Bernards. This doesn't avoid the moral dilemma, because we could race horses die out if we thought we had created a bad life for them. |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
Full Idea: I instinctively recoil from stepping on a spider or a forget-me-knot in my path, but neither of these responses expresses the fellow-feeling that forbids me to step on a rabbit or a mouse. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.41) | |
A reaction: It is fellow-feeling that makes us prefer mammals to reptiles. It seems wrong to build a moral system purely on empathy, because psychopaths don't even empathise with nice human beings. Externalism in morality. |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Lucky animals die in the jaws of a large predator; predators themselves are less lucky, when they die of lingering starvation; least fortunate are those killed by smaller creatures, such as maggots and bacteria. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.43) | |
A reaction: A nice insight, even if it does slide into claiming that we are simply large predators, and that therefore fox-hunting is a virtue… |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is easy to remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but the result is not a life which an animal should lead. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.44) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear where the "should" derives from here. You can't save them all, and large interventions would destroy the ecosystem. But should we never, say, put a victim out of its misery? |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Sheep and beef cattle live a quiet and comfortable life among their companions, and are despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.81) | |
A reaction: No rational person could envy a premature death, and we don't wait for cattle to be old before eating them. A quick death is little consolation for being murdered, and many people would prefer a slower death (without agony, of course). |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
Full Idea: There is a difference between the person who allows his terrier to kill wild rats, and the person who keeps tame rats for his terrier to kill. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |
A reaction: There are areas in the middle, where I encourage pheasants to breed 'wild' on my land. The purchase of a Rottweiller also tests the moral boundaries here. |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Too much concern for individual animals may in fact harm the species, by promoting diseased or degenerate members, or preventing population control. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |
A reaction: Okay till we reach human beings, where this principle won't go away, even if further principles about personhood, rationality and deep sympathy enter the picture. We can't be utilitarian about animals, and something else about humans. |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is hard to believe that those who would introduce wolves as a means of controlling the deer population have much sympathy for deer. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.91) | |
A reaction: Good point. If we assume that culling is required at all, then the decisive human actions which shock us on television may be nicer than the natural deaths that occur during the night. |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Animals exist outside the web of reciprocal rights and obligations, created by dialogue, but because they have no rights it does not mean that we have no duties towards them. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.97) | |
A reaction: The modern Kantian view of animals, though Kant struggled to show why we might have any duties to animals. Is mere compassion enough to produce a duty, or is it a luxurious indulgence of our nature? |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
Full Idea: We don't give help to British animals (through the RSPCA) rather than foreign animals because of their nearness or needs, but because of our sense of them as fellow citizens. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.104) | |
A reaction: A bit strong. It may, in fact, be because we look after them the way we look after the rest of our property. Even Kantians can be sentimental sometimes. |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
Full Idea: We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Anyone who says that key concepts, such as those concerning the mind, should come 'in degrees' wins my instant support. A whole car engine requires a very teleological explanation, the spark in the sparkplug far less so. |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
Full Idea: An object is specifically physical if it figures in explanations and descriptions of features of ordinary non-living matter, as in current physics; it is more generally physical if it is simply located in space-time. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.5) | |
A reaction: This gives a useful distinction when trying to formulate a 'physicalist' account of the mind, where type-type physicalism says only the 'postulates of physics' can be used, whereas 'naturalism' about the mind uses the more general concept. |