38 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Philosophers can sometimes be too fussy about the words they use, dismissing as 'unintelligible' or 'obscure' certain forms of language that are perfectly meaningful by ordinary standards, and which may be of some real use. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 01) | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophers are inclined to drop terms they can't formalise, but there is more to every concept than its formalisation (Frege's 'direction' for example). I want to rescue 'abstraction' and 'essence'. Rosen says distinguish, don't formalise. |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
Full Idea: From the simple fact that '1' figures in the definition of '2', it does not follow that 1 is part of 2. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: He observes that quite independent things can be mentioned on the two sides of a definition, with no parthood relation. You begin to wonder what a definition really is. A causal chain? |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Eventually set theory will have to be either naturalised or rejected, if a thoroughgoing physicalism is to be maintained. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I regard Platonism as a form of naturalism (though a rather bold and dramatic one). The central issue seems to be the ability of the human main/brain to form 'abstract' notions about the physical world in which it lives. |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
Full Idea: The failure of monotonicity is a general feature of explanatory relations. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 05) | |
A reaction: In other words, explanations can always shift in the light of new evidence. In principle this is right, but some explanations just seem permanent, like plate-tectonics as explanation for earthquakes. |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Our relation of 'in virtue of' is among facts or truths, whereas Fine's relation (if it is a relation at all) is a relation between a given truth and items whose natures ground that truth. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 07 n10) | |
A reaction: This disagreement between two key players in the current debate on grounding looks rather significant. I think I favour Fine's view, as it seems more naturalistic, and less likely to succumb to conventionalism. |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
Full Idea: If types cannot be reduced to more physical levels, this is not an embarrassment, as long as our institutional categories, our physiological categories, and our physical categories are just alternative groupings of the same tokens. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is a self-evident truth about a car engine, so I don't see why it wouldn't apply equally to a brain. Lycan's identification of the type as the thing which cannot be reduced seems a promising explanation of much confusion among philosophers. |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Institutional types are irreducible, though I assume that institutional tokens are reducible in the sense of strict identity, all the way down to the subatomic level. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This seems a promising distinction, as the boundaries of 'institutions' disappear when you begin to reduce them to lower levels (cf. Idea 4601), and yet plenty of institutions are self-evidently no more than physics. Plants are invisible as physics. |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
Full Idea: One space-time slice may be occupied by a collection of molecules, a metal strip, a key, an allower of entry to hotel rooms, a facilitator of adultery, and a destroyer souls. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Desdemona's handkerchief is a nice example. This sort of remark seems to be felt by some philosophers to be heartless wickedness, and yet it so screamingly self-evident that it is impossible to deny. |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Facts are structured entities built up from worldly items rather as sentences are built up from words. They might be identified with Russellian propositions. They are individuated by their constituents and composition, and are fine-grained. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 04) | |
A reaction: I'm a little cautious about the emphasis on being sentence-like. We have Russell's continual warnings against imposing subject-predicate structure on things. I think we should happily talk about 'facts' in metaphysics. |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.0) | |
A reaction: A passing remark in a discussion of functionalism about the mind, but I find it appealing. Causation is basic to materialistic metaphysics, and it creates networks of regular causes. It leaves open the essentialist question of WHY it has that role. |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
Full Idea: One intuitive gloss on 'intrinsic' property is that a property is intrinsic iff whether or not a thing has it depends entirely on how things stand with it and its parts, and not on its relation to some distinct thing. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 02) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a useful reward for reviving 'depends on' in metaphysical talk. The problem here would be to explain the 'thing' and its 'parts' without mentioning the target property. The thing certainly can't be a bundle of tropes. |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Many of our best words in philosophy do not admit of definition, the notion of metaphysical 'necessity' being one pertinent example. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 03) | |
A reaction: Rosen is busy defending words in metaphysics which cannot be pinned down with logical rigour. We are allowed to write □ for 'necessary', and it is accepted by logicians as being stable in a language. |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Fine says a truth is necessary when it is a logical consequence of the essential truths, but maybe it is a consequence of the essential truths together with the basic grounding laws (the 'Moorean connections'). | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 13) | |
A reaction: I'm with Fine all the way here, as we really don't need to clog nature up with things called 'grounding laws', which are both obscure and inexplicable. Fine's story is the one for naturalistically inclined philosophers. |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Personally I favour direct realism regarding secondary qualities, and identify greenness with some complex microphysical property exemplified by green physical objects. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4) | |
A reaction: He cites D.M.Armstrong (1981) as his source. Personally I find this a bewildering proposal. Does he think there is greenness in grass AS WELL AS the emission of that wavelength of electro-magnetic radiation? Is greenness zooming through the air? |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Intentionality comes in degrees. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: I agree. A footprint is 'about' a foot, in the sense of containing concentrated information about it. Can we, though, envisage a higher degree than human thought? Is there a maximum degree? Everything is 'about' everything, in some respect. |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The teleological view begins to explain intentionality, and in particular allows brain states and events to have false intentional content; causal and nomological theories of intentionality tend to falter on this last task. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Certainly if you say thought is 'caused' by the world, false thought become puzzling. I'm not sure I understand the rest of this, but it is an intriguing remark about a significant issue… |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Our phenomenal experience of pain has components - it is a complex, consisting (perhaps) of urges, desires, impulses, and beliefs, probably occurring at quite different levels of institutional abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be true, and offers the reductionist a strategy for making inroads into the supposed irreducable and fundamental nature of qualia. What's it like to be a complex hierarchically structured multi-functional organism? |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
Full Idea: It is just arbitrary to choose a level of nature a priori as the locus of qualia, even though we can agree that high levels (such as behaviourism) and low-levels (such as the subatomic) can be ruled out as totally improbable. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Very good. People scream 'qualia!' whenever the behaviour level or the atomic level are proposed as the locations of the mind, but the suggestion that they are complex, and are spread across many functional levels in the middle sounds good. |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
Full Idea: By interacting causally, Cartesian dualism seems to violate the conservation laws of physics (concerning matter and energy). This seems testable, and afferent and efferent pathways disappearing into thin air would suggest energy is not conserved. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 1.1) | |
A reaction: It would seem to be no problem as long as outputs were identical in energy to inputs. If the experiment could actually be done, the result might astonish us. |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Evolution has proceeded in all other known species by increasingly complex configurations of molecules and organs, which support primitive psychologies; our human psychologies are more advanced, but undeniably continuous with lower animals. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I find the evolution objection to dualism highly persuasive. I don't see how anyone can take evolution seriously and be a dualist. If there is a dramatic ontological break at some point, a plausible reason would be needed for that. |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Old joke: two Behaviourists meet in the street, and the first says,"You're fine; how am I?" | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], n1.6) | |
A reaction: This invites the response that introspection is uniquely authoritative about 'how we are', but this has been challenged quite a lot recently, which pushes us to consider whether these stupid behaviourists might actually have a good point. |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
Full Idea: 'Analytical functionalists', who hold that meanings of mental terms are determined by the causal roles associated with them by 'folk psychology', deny themselves appeals to lower levels of functional organisation. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably folk psychology can fit into the kind of empirical methodology favoured by behaviourists, whereas 'lower levels' are going to become rather speculative and unscientific. |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The functionalist must find a level of characterisation of mental states that is not so abstract or behaviouristic as to rule out the possibility of inverted spectrum etc., nor so specific and structural as to fall into chauvinism. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: If too specific then animals and aliens won't be able to implement the necessary functions; if the theory becomes very behaviouristic, then it loses interest in the possibility of an inverted spectrum. He is certainly right to hunt for a middle ground. |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Even the software/hardware distinction as it is literally applied within computer science is philosophically unclear. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is true, and very important for functionalist theories of the mind. Even very volatile software is realised in 'hard' physics, and rewritable discs etc blur the distinction between 'programmable' and 'hardwired'. |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Highly teleological characterisations, unlike naïve and explicated mental characterisations, have the virtue of shading off fairly smoothly into (more) brutely physical ones. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Thus the purpose of a car engine, and a spark plug, and the spark, and the temperature, and the vibration of molecules show a fading away of the overt purpose, disappearing into the pointless activity of electrons and quantum levels. |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I am taking mental types to form a small subclass of teleological types occurring for the most part at a high level of functional abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: He goes on to say that he understand teleology in evolutionary terms. There is always a gap between how you characterise or individuate something, and what it actually is. To say spanners are 'a small subclass of tools' is not enough. |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
Full Idea: 'Neuron' may be understood as a physiological term or a functional term, so even the Identity Theorist is a Functionalist - one who locates mental entities at a very low level of abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This is a striking observation, and somewhat inclines me to switch from identity theory to functionalism. If you ask what is the correct level of abstraction, Lycan's teleological-homuncular version refers you to all the levels. |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Teleological functionalism helps us to understand the nature of biological and psychological laws, particularly in the face of Davidsonian scepticism about the latter. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I doubt the existence of psycho-physical laws, but only because of the vast complexity. They would be like the laws of weather. 'Psycho-physical' laws seem to presuppose some sort of dualism. |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I am explicating the mental in a reductive way, by reducing mental characterizations to homuncular institutional ones, which are teleological characterizations at various levels of functional abstraction. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I think this is the germ of a very good physicalist account of the mind. More is needed than a mere assertion about what the mind reduces to at the very lowest level; this offers a decent account of the descending stages of reduction. |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Quite possibly a Martian's humanoid behaviour is prompted by his having sensations somewhat unlike ours, despite his superficial behavioural similarities to us. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4) | |
A reaction: I think this firmly refutes the multiple realisability objection to type-type physicalism. Mental events are individuated by their phenomenal features (known only to the user), and by their causal role (publicly available). These are separate. |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It sounds right to say that Fred's being a bachelor consists in (reduces to) being an unmarried male, but slightly off to say that Fred's being an unmarried male consists in (or reduces to) being a bachelor. There is a corresponding explanatory asymmetry. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: This emerging understanding of the asymmetry of the idea shows that we are not just dealing with a simple semantic identity. Our concepts are richer than our language. He adds that a ball could be blue in virtue of being cerulean. |
22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
Full Idea: It is suggested that anyone who has considered all the facts which could bear on his moral position has ipso facto produced a 'well founded' moral judgement, ...How 'x is good' can be well founded when 'x is bad' is equally well founded is hard to see. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.96) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a warning to particularists, if they hope that moral judgements just emerge from the facts. It doesn't rule out physicalist naturalism about morality, if the attitudes we bring to the facts have arisen out of further facts. |
22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
Full Idea: I do not know what could be meant by saying it was someone's duty to do something unless there was an attempt to show why it mattered if this sort of thing was not done. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.105) | |
A reaction: The Kantian idea assumes that duty is an absolute, and yet each duty rests on a particular maxim which is going to be universalised. So why should that maxim be universalised, and not some other? |
22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
Full Idea: Whether a man is speaking of behaviour as rude or not rude, he must use the same criteria as anyone else. ...We have here an example of a non-evaluative premise from which an evaluative conclusion can be deduced. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.104) | |
A reaction: We would now call 'rude' a 'thick' ethical concept (where 'good' is 'thin'). Her powerful point is, I take it, that evidence is always relevant to judgements of thick concepts, so there is no fact-value gap. 'Rude' has criteria, but 'good' may not. |
22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
Full Idea: To show that facts and values are connected we must show that some things do and some things don't count in favour of a moral conclusion, and that no one can choose what counts as evidence for rightness or wrongness. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.99) | |
A reaction: But what sort of facts might do the job? I can only think of right functioning and health as facts which seem to imply value. Pleasure and misery don't quite get there. |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
Full Idea: We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Anyone who says that key concepts, such as those concerning the mind, should come 'in degrees' wins my instant support. A whole car engine requires a very teleological explanation, the spark in the sparkplug far less so. |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
Full Idea: An object is specifically physical if it figures in explanations and descriptions of features of ordinary non-living matter, as in current physics; it is more generally physical if it is simply located in space-time. | |
From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.5) | |
A reaction: This gives a useful distinction when trying to formulate a 'physicalist' account of the mind, where type-type physicalism says only the 'postulates of physics' can be used, whereas 'naturalism' about the mind uses the more general concept. |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |
Full Idea: To be an acid just is to be a proton donor. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: My interest here is in whether we can say that we have found the 'essence' of an acid - so we want to know whether something 'deeper' explains the proton-donation. I suspect not. Being a proton donor happens to have a group of related consequences. |