38 ideas
7893 | Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1) | |
A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view? |
23770 | Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: A reductive analysis is one that provides an alternative set of concepts by which some target concept can be understood. It must be non-circular, and given in terms of concepts that are themselves better understood. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.2) | |
A reaction: There seem to be two aims of analysis: this one emphasises understanding, but the other one concerns ontology - by demonstrating that some concept or thing can be understood fully by what happens at a lower level. |
23769 | Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The form of argument which sells an ontology on the basis a metaphysic is known as an 'argument-by-display'. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.2) | |
A reaction: [Attributed to John Bigelow 1999] New to me, but I'm quite a fan of this. For example, my rejection of platonism is not based on specific arguments, but on looking at the whole platonic picture of reality. |
23783 | Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of change. I am starting with the assumptions that it is a causal phenomenon, and that it requires explanation. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.1) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that we need a theory which explains change, rather than just describing it. Well said. Williams says, roughly, that each stage causes the next stage. |
23784 | Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: No process every really starts or ends. …A process we see as derailed is really just an expected sequence that continues in an unexpected direction. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Obviously if you cannot individuate processes, then the concept of a process is not much use in ontology. Williams rejects processes, and I think he is probably right. He breaks processes down into smaller units. |
23790 | Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Processes can be modelled in two ways. They are drawn out events encompassing many changes, but dissectible into short-lived states, none including change. Or they are continuous and impenetrable, and to split them is impossible. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 09.3) | |
A reaction: Obviously a process has temporal moments in it, so the unsplittability is conceptual. I find the concept of changeless parts baffling. But if processes are drawn out, they can't be basic to ontology. |
23786 | The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The status quo is part of what exists, and thus it is a proper topic of concern for the metaphysician, and so it warrants explanation. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 07.2) | |
A reaction: His point is that ontology as a mere inventory of things gives no account of why they remain unchanged, as well as their processes and connections. |
23768 | A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: A metaphysic is what you get when you embed a fundamental ontology within a larger metaphysical framework by repeatedly appealing to elements of that ontology in explaining metaphysical phenomena. …Only then do you see what the ontology is worth. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Confirming my mantra that metaphysics is an explanatory activity. I think it is important that the ontology includes relations (such as 'determinations'), and is not just an inventory of types of entity. |
23773 | Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The main components of neo-Humean metaphysics are that properties are inherently non-modal and passive, that what is possible is restricted only by imagination and coherence, that laws are non-governing descriptions, and causation is weak and extrinsic. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This is Williams identifying the enemy, prior to offering the much more active and restictive powers ontology. I'm with Williams. |
23779 | We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: There seems to be a mysterious desire to posit entities simply because certain terms pop up in our vocabulary. But we should not be so indiscriminate about our posits, even if our talk is properly vetted. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 04.1) | |
A reaction: This should hardly need saying, and the familiar example is 'for the sake of' entailing sakes, but it seems to be a vice that is still found in metaphysical philosophy. The word 'nothingness' comes to mind. |
23775 | Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Powers are 'multi-track', meaning that they are capable of producing a variety of different manifestations when me with diverse stimuli. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.1) | |
A reaction: He later mentions magnetism. Not convinced of this. Powers probably never exist in isolation, so a different manifestation could be because a different power becomes involved. (Bird is a single-tracker). |
23780 | Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: On the model of powers I prefer, every possible state of affairs that can arise is written into the powers that would constitute them. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 04.3) | |
A reaction: I can't make any sense of 'written into', any more than I could when Leibniz proposed roughly the same thing about monads. I presume he means that any state of affairs which ever arises is the expression of the intrinsic nature of powers. |
23789 | Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Naming powers is unwise; the main reason is that there is a long tradition of naming powers according to the manifestations they can produce, and that does not square well with multi-track powers. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 08.4) | |
A reaction: On the other hand there must be some attempt to individuate powers (by scientists, if not by philosophers), and that can only rely on the manifestations. Describe them, rather than name them? Just assign them a number! |
23771 | Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Physics describes fundamental entities exclusively in terms of what sound like powers. 'Charge' names the power to produce electromagnetic fields; 'spin' the power to contribute to the angular momentum of of system; 'mass' to produce gravitational force. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.4) | |
A reaction: These are the three basic properties of an electron, which is fundamental in the standard model. You can say that their field is more fundamental than the particles, but the field is also only known as a set of powers. Powers rule! |
23776 | Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Power Monism: all properties are powers. Categoricalism: all fundamentals are categorical. Dualism allows both types. I defend Mixed Monism - that there is a single class of fundamental properties that are at once powerful and categorical. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is the main dilemma for the powers ontology - of how powers can be basic, if there needs to be some entity which possesses the power. But what possesses the powers of an electron? I like Williams's idea, without being clear about it. |
23777 | Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The mode in which a power presents itself is more complicated than those properties that have (strictly) nothing more to them than that which is always on display. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea that nature is dynamic, and so must consist of potentials as well as actuals. Interesting distinction. A basic division between those properties 'always on display', and those that are not? |
23774 | There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: It is no surprise that talk of dispositions, capacities, abilities, tendencies, powers, and potentialities are part of our everyday interactions. …I have in mind a basic set of powers, the sort which underlie all of these. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the correct picture. It is misleading say that a ball has a 'power' to roll smoothly. The powers are inside the ball. |
23791 | Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Powers are the properties at the core of the powers ontology, and dispositions are more like useful talk. …Dispositions are the phenomena to be explained by the power metaphysic. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 10.2) | |
A reaction: The picture I subscribe to. The first step is to see nature as dynamic (as Aristotle does with his 'potentialities'), and the next step to understand what must ground these dynamic dispositional properties. He calls dispositions 'process initiators'. |
23772 | If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: If objects are bundles of properties …they must be robust enough to enter into building relations with one another such that they can form objects. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.5) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. The Humean bundle view of objects just seems to take properties to be 'impressions' or verbal predicates, but they must have causal powers to be a grounding for ontology. |
23788 | Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: 'Perdurantism' is the view that objects persist by being composed of temporal parts. When it is commonly combined with the eternalist account of the ontology of time, the result is known as 'four-dimensionalism'. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 08.1) | |
A reaction: At last, a clear account of the distinction between these two! They're both wrong. He says the result is the spatiotemporal 'worm' view (i.e. one temporal extended thing, rather than a collection of parts). |
7898 | The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170) | |
A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism. |
7894 | Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5) | |
A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied. |
7899 | Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods? | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186) | |
A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure? |
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: To fairly divide a cake between two children, the first divides it and the second chooses. …Even division is best, as it anticipates the second child will take the largest piece. Fairness is enforced by the children's self-interests. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Cake') | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is introduced as the basic principle of game theory. There is an online video of two cats sharing a dish of milk; each one drinks a bit, then pushes the dish to the other one. I'm sure two children could manage that. |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: At the most abstract level, game theory is about tables with numbers in them - numbers that entities are are efficiently acting to maximise or minimise. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Curve') | |
A reaction: A brilliant idea. The question is the extent to which real life conforms to the numberical tables. The assumption that everyone is entirely self-seeking is blatantly false. Numbers like money have diminishing marginal utility. |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The minimax theorem says that there is always a rational solution to a precisely defined conflict between two people whose interests are completely opposite. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Minimax') | |
A reaction: This is Von Neumann's founding theorem of game theory. It concerns maximising minimums, and minimising maximums. Crucially, I would say that it virtually never occurs that two people have completely opposite interests. There is a common good. |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: Prisoners A and B can support or betray one another. If both support, they each get 1 year in prison. If one betrays, the betrayer gets 0 and the betrayed gets 3. If they both betray they get 2 each. The common good is to support each other. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 06 'Tucker's') | |
A reaction: [by Albert Tucker, highly compressed] The classic Prisoner's Dilemma. It is artificial, but demonstrates that selfish behaviour gets a bad result (total of four years imprisonment), but the common good gets only two years. Every child should study this! |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The tragedy is when two 'nice' players defect because they misread the other's intentions. The puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma is how such good intentions pave the road to hell. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 11 'Howard's') | |
A reaction: I really wish these simple ideas were better known. They more or less encapsulate the tragedy of the human race, with its inability to prioritise the common good. |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The successful TIT FOR TAT strategy (for the iterated prisoner's dilemma) says cooperate on the first round, then do whatever the other player did in the previous round. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: There are also the tougher TWO TITS FOR A TAT, and the more forgiving TIT FOR TWO TATS. The one-for-one seems to be the main winner, and is commonly seen in animal life (apparently). I recommend this to school teachers. |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: TIT FOR TAT threatens 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else!'. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: Essentially human happiness arises if we are all nice, but also stand up firmly for ourselves. 'Doormats' (nice all the time) get exploited. TIT FOR TAT is weak, because it doesn't exploit people who don't respond at all. |
7896 | The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121) | |
A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery. |
7897 | The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122) | |
A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed. |
7895 | Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61) | |
A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship. |
23785 | Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: I believe that it is also the job of a theory of causation to explain non-change | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 07.2) | |
A reaction: Good point. Most attempts to pin down causation refer only to changes and differences. Two playing cards propping one another up is his example. |
23782 | Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Causation is the exercising of powers. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Job done. Get over it. This is the view I prefer. |
23787 | If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: It would be shocking if an account of causation ruled out the possibility of change. But if a cause perfectly overlaps its effect in time, then the rejection of change is precisely what follows. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 07.6) | |
A reaction: He cites Kant, Martin, Heil and Mumford/Anjum for this view. The latter seem to see causation as a 'process' (allowing change), which Williams as ruled out. The Williams point must be correct. |
23778 | Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Powers carry their lawlike features within them: it is part of their essence, qua power. Their pointing at future states just is their internal law-like nature; it is what gets expressed in such and such conditions. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Modern writers on powers seem unaware that Leibniz got there first. This seems to me the correct account of the ontology of laws. The formulation of laws is probably the best descriptive system for nature's patterns (over time as well as space). |
7900 | Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224) | |
A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself? |