20 ideas
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world. | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality. |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience. | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists). |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third? | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course. |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning. | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished. |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science). | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced. |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect. | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers. |
| 21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
| Full Idea: By a 'propositional function' I mean something which contains a variable x, and expresses a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to x. That is to say, it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.216) | |
| A reaction: This is Frege's notion of a 'concept', as an assertion of a predicate which still lacks a subject. |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Such a proposition as 'all the judgements made by Epimenedes are true' will only be prima facie capable of truth if all his judgements are of the same order. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.227) | |
| A reaction: This is an attempt to use his theory of types to solve the Liar. Tarski's invocation of a meta-language is clearly in the same territory. |
| 23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of types meant that features common to different levels of the hierarchy became uncapturable (since any attempt to capture them would involve a predicate which disobeyed the hierarchy restrictions). | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear whether this is the main reason why type theory was abandoned. Ramsey was an important critic. |
| 21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
| Full Idea: In Russell's mature 1910 theory of types classes are defined in terms of propositional functions, and functions themselves are regimented by a ramified theory of types mitigated by the axiom of reducibility. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.133 |
| 21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We will define a function of one variable as 'predicative' when it is of the next order above that of its arguments, i.e. of the lowest order compatible with its having an argument. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.237) | |
| A reaction: 'Predicative' just means it produces a set. This is Russell's strict restriction on which functions are predicative. |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on. | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus. |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience. | |
| From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2) |
| 22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: To fairly divide a cake between two children, the first divides it and the second chooses. …Even division is best, as it anticipates the second child will take the largest piece. Fairness is enforced by the children's self-interests. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Cake') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is introduced as the basic principle of game theory. There is an online video of two cats sharing a dish of milk; each one drinks a bit, then pushes the dish to the other one. I'm sure two children could manage that. |
| 22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: At the most abstract level, game theory is about tables with numbers in them - numbers that entities are are efficiently acting to maximise or minimise. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Curve') | |
| A reaction: A brilliant idea. The question is the extent to which real life conforms to the numberical tables. The assumption that everyone is entirely self-seeking is blatantly false. Numbers like money have diminishing marginal utility. |
| 22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: The minimax theorem says that there is always a rational solution to a precisely defined conflict between two people whose interests are completely opposite. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Minimax') | |
| A reaction: This is Von Neumann's founding theorem of game theory. It concerns maximising minimums, and minimising maximums. Crucially, I would say that it virtually never occurs that two people have completely opposite interests. There is a common good. |
| 22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: Prisoners A and B can support or betray one another. If both support, they each get 1 year in prison. If one betrays, the betrayer gets 0 and the betrayed gets 3. If they both betray they get 2 each. The common good is to support each other. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 06 'Tucker's') | |
| A reaction: [by Albert Tucker, highly compressed] The classic Prisoner's Dilemma. It is artificial, but demonstrates that selfish behaviour gets a bad result (total of four years imprisonment), but the common good gets only two years. Every child should study this! |
| 22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: The tragedy is when two 'nice' players defect because they misread the other's intentions. The puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma is how such good intentions pave the road to hell. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 11 'Howard's') | |
| A reaction: I really wish these simple ideas were better known. They more or less encapsulate the tragedy of the human race, with its inability to prioritise the common good. |
| 22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: The successful TIT FOR TAT strategy (for the iterated prisoner's dilemma) says cooperate on the first round, then do whatever the other player did in the previous round. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
| A reaction: There are also the tougher TWO TITS FOR A TAT, and the more forgiving TIT FOR TWO TATS. The one-for-one seems to be the main winner, and is commonly seen in animal life (apparently). I recommend this to school teachers. |
| 22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: TIT FOR TAT threatens 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else!'. | |
| From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
| A reaction: Essentially human happiness arises if we are all nice, but also stand up firmly for ourselves. 'Doormats' (nice all the time) get exploited. TIT FOR TAT is weak, because it doesn't exploit people who don't respond at all. |