28 ideas
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200) | |
A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine. |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209) | |
A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless. |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes'). |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Knowledge 'that' is descriptive, and knowledge 'why' is explanatory, and it is the latter that provides scientific understanding of our world. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree, but of course, knowing 'why' may require a lot of knowing 'that'. People with extensive knowledge 'that' things are so tend to understand why something happens more readily than the rest of us ignoramuses. |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Understanding is an extremely vague concept. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: True, I suppose, but we usually recognise understanding when we encounter it, and everybody has a pretty clear notion of an 'increase' in understanding. I suspect that the concept is perfectly clear, but we lack any scale for measuring it. |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Various kinds of correlations exist that provide excellent bases for prediction, but because no suitable causal relations exist (or are known), these correlations do not furnish explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There may be problem cases for the claim that all explanations are causal, but I certainly think that this idea is essentially right. Prediction can come from induction, but inductions may be true and yet baffling. |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There is a centuries-old philosophical tradition, sometimes referred to by the name of 'instrumentalism', that has denied the claim that science has explanatory power. For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: [He quotes Coffa] Presumably it is just a matter of matching the world to the readings on the instruments, aiming at van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'. If there are no scientific explanations, does that mean that there are no explanations at all? Daft! |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Inductive logicians have a 'requirement of total evidence': induction is strong if 1) it has true premises, 2) it has correct inductive form, and 3) no additional evidence that would change the degree of support is available at the time. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.4.2) | |
A reaction: The evidence might be very close at hand, but not quite 'available' to the person doing the induction. |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I reject the view that scientific explanation involves reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sometimes seems to imply this account of explanation, and I would have to agree with Salmon's view of it. Aristotle is also, though, aware of real explanations, definitions and essences. People are 'familiar' with some peculiar things. |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There are evidence-seeking why-questions, as well as explanation-seeking why-questions. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Surely we would all prefer an explanation to mere evidence? It seems to me that they are all explanation-seeking, but that we are grateful for some evidence when no full explanation is available. Explanation renders evidence otiose. |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There are three basic conceptions of scientific explanation - modal, epistemic, and ontic - which can be discerned in Aristotle, and that have persisted down the ages. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1) |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The 'inferential' conception of scientific explanation is the thesis that all legitimate scientific explanations are arguments of one sort or another. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that someone has to be persuaded of something, and hence seems a rather too pragmatic view. I presume an explanation might be no more than dumbly pointing at conclusive evidence of a cause. Man with smoking gun. |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Proponents of the ontic conception of explanation can say that explanations exist in the world as facts, or that they are reports of such facts (as opposed to the view of explanations as arguments, or as speech acts). | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I am strongly drawn to the ontic approach, but not sure whether we want facts, or reports of them. The facts are the causal nexus, but which parts of the nexus provide the main aspect of explanation? I'll vote for reports, for now. |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The problem is to distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations, for laws have explanatory force while accidental generalizations, even if they are true, do not. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Hempel and Oppenheim 1948] This seems obviously right, but I can only make sense of the explanatory power if we have identified the mechanism which requires the generalisation to continue in future cases. |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The deductive-nomological view has an explanation/prediction symmetry thesis - that a correct explanation could be a scientific prediction, and that any deductive prediction could serve as a deductive-nomological explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Of course, not all predictions will explain, or vice versa. Weird regularities become predictable but remain baffling. Good explanations may be of unrepeatable events. It is the 'law' in the account that ties the two ends together. |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
Full Idea: To provide an adequate explanation of any given fact, we need to provide information that is relevant to the occurrence of that fact - information that makes a difference to its occurrence. It is not enough to subsume it under a general law. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bromberger for this idea] Salmon is identifying this idea as the beginnings of trouble for the covering-law account of explanation, and it sounds exactly right. |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The height of the flagpole explains the length of the shadow because the interaction between the sunlight and the flagpole occurs before the interaction between the sunlight and the ground. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6) | |
A reaction: [Bromberger produced the flagpole example] This seems to be correct, and would apply to all physical cases, but there may still be cases of explanation which are not causal (in mathematics, for example). |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
Full Idea: My basic feeling about explanation in the quantum realm is that it will involve mechanisms, but mechanisms that are quite different from those that seem to work in the macrocosm. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: Since I take most explanation to be by mechanisms (or some abstraction analogous to mechanisms), then I think this is probably right (rather than being by new 'laws'). |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
Full Idea: In functional explanation, there is a disagreement over whether an item has a function the first time it occurs. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.8) | |
A reaction: This question arises particularly in evolutionary contexts, and would obviously not generally arise in the case of human artefacts. |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I favour an ontic conception of explanation, that explanations reveal the mechanisms, causal or other, that produce the facts we are trying to explain. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [He also cites Coffa and Peter Railton] A structure may explain, and only be supported by causal powers, but it doesn't seem to be the causal powers that do the explaining. Is a peg fitting a hole explained causally? |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be one of the reasons why explanation must ultimately reside at the level of individual objects and events, rather than residing with generalisations and laws. |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Statistical relevance, not high probability, is the key desideratum in statistical explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.5) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is because the explanation will not ultimately be probabilistic at all, but mechanical and causal. Hence the link is what counts, which is the relevance. He notes that relevance needs two values instead of one high value. |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Perhaps we should think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Coffa 1974 for this] I find this suggestion very appealing, as it connects up with dispositions and powers, which I take to be the building blocks of all explanation. It is, of course, easier to render frequencies numerically. |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |