14 ideas
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323) | |
A reaction: In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too). |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
Full Idea: We should abandon the idea that the use of plural forms commits us to the existence of sets/classes… Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. There are not two sorts of things in the world, individuals and collections. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]), quoted by Henry Laycock - Object | |
A reaction: The problem of quantifying over sets is notoriously difficult. Try http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/index.html. |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Is there, in addition to the 200 Cheerios in a bowl, also a set of them all? And what about the vast number of subsets of Cheerios? It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios you are eating a set. What you are doing is: eating the Cheerios. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: In my case Boolos is preaching to the converted. I am particularly bewildered by someone (i.e. Quine) who believes that innumerable sets exist while 'having a taste for desert landscapes' in their ontology. |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos has proposed an alternative understanding of monadic, second-order logic, in terms of plural quantifiers, which many philosophers have found attractive. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5 |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: In an indisputable technical result, Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can be used to interpret monadic second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], Intro) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed Intro |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Boolos discovered that any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], §1) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed p.74 |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Indispensable to cross-reference, lacking distinctive content, and pervading thought and discourse, 'identity' is without question a logical concept. Adding it to predicate calculus significantly increases the number and variety of inferences possible. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.54) | |
A reaction: It is not at all clear to me that identity is a logical concept. Is 'existence' a logical concept? It seems to fit all of Boolos's criteria? I say that all he really means is that it is basic to thought, but I'm not sure it drives the reasoning process. |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos proposes that second-order quantifiers be regarded as 'plural quantifiers' are in ordinary language, and has developed a semantics along those lines. In this way they introduce no new ontology. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 7 n32 | |
A reaction: This presumably has to treat simple predicates and relations as simply groups of objects, rather than having platonic existence, or something. |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Standard second-order existential quantifiers pick out a class or a property, but Boolos suggests that they be understood as a plural quantifier, like 'there are objects' or 'there are people'. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4 | |
A reaction: This idea has potential application to mathematics, and Lewis (1991, 1993) 'invokes it to develop an eliminative structuralism' (Shapiro). |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Abandon the idea that use of plural forms must always be understood to commit one to the existence of sets of those things to which the corresponding singular forms apply. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.66) | |
A reaction: It seems to be an open question whether plural quantification is first- or second-order, but it looks as if it is a rewriting of the first-order. |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Boolos virtually patented the new device of plural quantification. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by José A. Benardete - Logic and Ontology | |
A reaction: This would be 'there are some things such that...' |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Ontological commitment is carried by first-order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier needn't be taken to be a first-order quantifier in disguise, having special items, collections, as its range. They are two ways of referring to the same things. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: If second-order quantifiers are just a way of referring, then we can see first-order quantifiers that way too, so we could deny 'objects'. |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good. | |
From: William of Ockham (Reportatio [1330], III Q viii) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting 'Damascene'] I quote this for interest, but I very much doubt whether Damascene or William knew what it meant, and I certainly don't. There seems to have been a politically correct desire to invent super-powers for God. |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: What we abstract is said to belong to perfection in so far as it can be predicated of God and can stand for Him. For if such a concept could not be abstracted from a creature, then in this life we could not arrive at a cognition of God's wisdom. | |
From: William of Ockham (Reportatio [1330], III Q viii) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the germ of an important argument. Without the ability to abstract from what is experienced, we would not be able to apply general concepts to things which are beyond experience. It is a key idea for empiricism. |