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22132
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Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals.
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From:
William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056
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A reaction:
'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist.
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6901
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Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge]
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Full Idea:
Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding.
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From:
Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding.
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9260
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Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
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Full Idea:
It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality.
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From:
H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
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A reaction:
One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere.
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9258
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If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
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Full Idea:
If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong.
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From:
H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4)
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A reaction:
A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself.
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19381
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The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist.
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From:
William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist'
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A reaction:
I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all.
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