11 ideas
17750 | The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic was in 1928 [Hilbert/Ackermann, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic is found in the 1928 book of Hilbert and Ackermann. | |
From: report of Hilbert,D/Ackermann,W (Principles of Theoretical Logic [1928]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.1 |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the notion of a proper name itself involves essentialism. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.43) | |
A reaction: This is just before Kripke's announcement of 'rigid designation', which seems to have relaunched modern essentialism. The thought is that you can't name something, if you don't have a stable notion of what is (and isn't) being named. |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Can't I name all the real numbers in the interval (0,1) at once? Couldn't I name them all 'Charley', for example? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.40) | |
A reaction: Plantinga is nervous about such a sweeping move, but can't think of an objection. This addresses a big problem, I think - that you are supposed to accept the real numbers when we cannot possibly name them all. |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: If anything is essential to Socrates, surely self-identity is. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.37) | |
A reaction: This is the modern move of Plantinga and Adams, to make 'is identical with Socrates' the one property which assures the identity of Socrates (his 'haecceity'). My view is that self-identity is not a property. Plantinga wonders about that on p.44. |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: An object has a property essentially just in case it couldn't conceivably have lacked that property. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.35) | |
A reaction: Making it depend on what we can conceive seems a bit dubious, for someone committed to real essences. The key issue is how narrowly or broadly you interpret the word 'property'. The word 'object' needs a bit of thought, too! |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Some statements predicate modality of another statement (modality 'de dicto'); but others predicate of an object the necessary or essential possession of a property; these latter express modality 'de re'. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.26) | |
A reaction: The distinction seems to originate in Aquinas, concerning whether God knows the future (or, how he knows the future). 'De dicto' is straightforward, but possibly the result of convention. 'De re' is controversial, and implies deep metaphysics. |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Aquinas says if a 'de dicto' statement is true, the 'de re' version may be false. The opposite also applies: 'What I am thinking of [17] is essentially prime' is true, but 'The proposition "what I am thinking of is prime" is necessarily true' is false. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.27) | |
A reaction: In his examples the first is 'de re' (about the number), and the second is 'de dicto' (about that proposition). |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: To explain the 'de re' via the 'de dicto' is to provide a rule enabling us to find, for each de re proposition, an equivalent de dicto proposition. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.41) | |
A reaction: Many 'de dicto' paraphrases will change the modality of a 'de re' statement, so the challenge is to find the right equivalent version. Plantinga takes up this challenge. The 'de dicto' statement says the object has the property, and must have it. |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Is there a difference between what Socrates could have been, and what he could have become? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.44) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, 1) how different might he have been in the past, given how he is now?, and 2) how different might he have been in the past, and now, if he had permanently diverged from how he is now? 1) has tight constraints on it. |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good. | |
From: William of Ockham (Reportatio [1330], III Q viii) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting 'Damascene'] I quote this for interest, but I very much doubt whether Damascene or William knew what it meant, and I certainly don't. There seems to have been a politically correct desire to invent super-powers for God. |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: What we abstract is said to belong to perfection in so far as it can be predicated of God and can stand for Him. For if such a concept could not be abstracted from a creature, then in this life we could not arrive at a cognition of God's wisdom. | |
From: William of Ockham (Reportatio [1330], III Q viii) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the germ of an important argument. Without the ability to abstract from what is experienced, we would not be able to apply general concepts to things which are beyond experience. It is a key idea for empiricism. |