Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'What Numbers Are' and 'Structuralism Reconsidered'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity.
     From: William of Ockham (works [1335])
     A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP]
     Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers.
     From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], V)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride]
     Full Idea: The mathematically significant properties and relations of natural numbers arise from the successor function that orders them; the natural numbers are identified simply as the objects that answer to this basic function.
     From: Fraser MacBride (Structuralism Reconsidered [2007], §1)
     A reaction: So Julius Caesar would be a number if he was the successor of Pompey the Great? I would have thought that counting should be mentioned - cardinality as well as ordinality. Presumably Peano's Axioms are being referred to.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP]
     Full Idea: Statements involving finite cardinalities can be made without treating numbers as objects at all, simply by using quantification and identity to define numerically definite quantifiers in the manner of Frege.
     From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], IV)
     A reaction: [He adds Quine 1960:268 as a reference]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
     Full Idea: The identification of mathematical objects with positions in structures rests upon the prior credibility of the thesis that positions are objects in their own right.
     From: Fraser MacBride (Structuralism Reconsidered [2007], §3)
     A reaction: Sounds devastating, but something has to get the whole thing off the ground. This is why Resnik's word 'patterns' is so appealing. Patterns stare you in the face, and they don't change if all the objects making it up are replaced by others.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals.
     From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056
     A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist.
     From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist'
     A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam.
     From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9
     A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location.
     From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4