40 ideas
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
Full Idea: Wisdom implies no more knowledge and understanding than anyone of normal capacity can and should acquire in the course of an ordinary life. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: Have philosophers stopped talking about wisdom precisely because you now need three university degrees to be considered even remotely good at phillosophy? Hence wisdom is an inferior attainment, because Foot is right. |
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Choice seems better treated as a non-logical principle of set-theory. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4 n8) | |
A reaction: This reinforces the idea that set theory is not part of logic (and so pure logicism had better not depend on set theory). |
10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicitly define one-one correspondence from the sets to the ordinals (because there is no explicit well-ordering of R). Nevertheless, the Axiom of Choice guarantees that a one-one correspondence does exist, even if we cannot define it. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 10) |
10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
Full Idea: We might reduce sets to ordinal numbers, thereby reversing the standard set-theoretical reduction of ordinals to sets. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 10) | |
A reaction: He has demonstrated that there are as many ordinals as there are sets. |
10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Extensional mereology defs: 'distinct' things have no parts in common; a 'fusion' has some things all of which are parts, with no further parts. Axioms: (transitivity) a part of a part is part of the whole; (sums) any things have a unique fusion. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 5) |
10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
Full Idea: If we extend the power of language with plural definite descriptions, these would pick out the largest class of things that fit the description. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 3) |
10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
Full Idea: It may be that plural reference gives atomism the resources to state complex facts without needing to refer to complex things. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: This seems the most interesting metaphysical implication of the possibility of plural quantification. |
10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
Full Idea: If all properties are distributive, plural reference is just a handy abbreviation to avoid repetition (as in 'A and B are hungry', to avoid 'A is hungry and B is hungry'), but not all properties are distributive (as in 'some people surround a table'). | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 2) | |
A reaction: The characteristic examples to support plural quantification involve collective activity and relations, which might be weeded out of our basic ontology, thus leaving singular quantification as sufficient. |
10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Singular comprehension principles have a bad reputation, but the plural comprehension principle says that given a condition on individuals, there are some things such that something is one of them iff it meets the condition. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4) |
10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
Full Idea: In a plural language we can discuss without fear of inconsistency the things that are not members of themselves. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4) | |
A reaction: [see Hossack for details] |
10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 8) |
10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
Full Idea: I take the real numbers to be just lengths. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 9) | |
A reaction: I love it. Real numbers are beginning to get on my nerves. They turn up to the party with no invitation and improperly dressed, and then refuse to give their names when challenged. |
10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
Full Idea: A language with plurals is better for arithmetic. Instead of a first-order fragment expressible by an induction schema, we have the complete truth with a plural induction axiom, beginning 'If there are some numbers...'. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4) |
10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
Full Idea: In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 8) |
10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Set theory is the science of infinity. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 10) |
10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
Full Idea: By Quine's test of ontological commitment, if some children are sitting in a circle, no individual child can sit in a circle, so a singular paraphrase will have us committed to a 'group' of children. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 2) | |
A reaction: Nice of why Quine is committed to the existence of sets. Hossack offers plural quantification as a way of avoiding commitment to sets. But is 'sitting in a circle' a real property (in the Shoemaker sense)? I can sit in a circle without realising it. |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Complex particulars are of at least three types: masses (which sum, of which we do not ask 'how many?' but 'how much?'); composite individuals (how many?, and summing usually fails); and sets (only divisible one way, unlike composites). | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: A composite pile of grains of sand gradually becomes a mass, and drops of water become 'water everywhere'. A set of people divides into individual humans, but redescribe the elements as the union of males and females? |
10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The relation of composition seems to be indispensable in a correct account of the part-whole relation for individuals. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of a critical discussion of mereology and ontological atomism. At first blush it doesn't look as if 'composition' has much chance of being a precise notion, and it will be plagued with vagueness. |
10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
Full Idea: We can employ Leibniz's Law against mereological atomism. Water is wet, but no water molecule is wet. The set of infinite numbers is infinite, but no finite number is infinite. ..But with plural reference the atomist can resist this argument. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea of plural reference is to state plural facts without referring to complex things, which is interesting. The general idea is that we have atomism, and then all the relations, unities, identities etc. are in the facts, not in the things. I like it. |
10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The fusion of five rectangles may have a decomposition into more than five parts that are rectangles. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 8) |
10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
Full Idea: A thought can refer to a particular or a universal or a state of affairs, but it can predicate only a universal and it can affirm only a state of affairs. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: Hossack is summarising Armstrong's view, which he is accepting. To me, 'thought' must allow for animals, unlike language. I think Hossack's picture is much too clear-cut. Do animals grasp universals? Doubtful. Can they predicate? Yes. |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
Full Idea: I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of will. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Where does that put the successful and clever criminal? Presumably they are broadly irrational, but narrowly rational - but that is not very clear distinction. She says Kant's concept of the good will is too pure, and unrelated to human good. |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity. |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations. |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans. |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good. |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies). |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
Full Idea: A moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: She avoids the word 'function', and only deals with living creatures, but she uses a 'good knife' as an example, and this Aristotelian view clearly applies to any machine which has a function. |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
Full Idea: Possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and work, and friendship. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: I've not encountered discussion of 'deep' happiness before. I heard of an old man in tears because he had just seen a Purple Emperor butterfly for the first time. She makes it sound very conservative. How about mountaineering achievements? |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
Full Idea: In my terminology 'happiness' is understood as the enjoyment of good things, meaning the enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: A modified version of Aristotle's view, which she contrasts with McDowell's identification of happiness with the life of virtue. They all seem to have an optimistic hope that the pleasure in being a bit wicked is false happiness. |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor. |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
Full Idea: We know perfectly well that it is not true that the best life would consist in successfully pretending friendship: having friends to serve one but without being a real friend oneself. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: For some skallywags the achieving of something for nothing seems to be very much the good life, but not many of them want to exploit people who are seen to be their friends. |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
Full Idea: To speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will (his 'will as controllable by reason'). | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: She more or less agrees with Kant that the only truly good moral thing is a good will, though she has plenty of other criticisms of his views. |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
Full Idea: If a stranger should come on us when we are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill us. …In human life as it is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in the one who does it. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: A rare swipe from Foot at existentialism, which she hardly ever mentions. I find it hard to see these existential virtues as in any way moral. It means nothing to other citizens whether one of their number is 'authentic'. |
10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |
Full Idea: We might dispense with substantival space, and say that if the distribution of matter in space could have been different, that just means the matter of the Universe could have been shaped differently (with geometry as the science of shapes). | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 9) |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |